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I am a PhD student in Economics at Princeton University. I work in Empirical Industrial Organization, focusing on Urban Economics. I am also interested in Market Design and the Economics of Digitization.


Working Papers

(Click on paper descriptions to see abstracts)

Urban Economics


Market design, subsidies and supply: Towards efficient and equitable public housing
  • Joint work with Andrew Ferdowsian and Luther Yap.
  • Presented at (by self or coauthor):
    • 15th North American Meeting, Urban Economics Association (2021); Summer School in Urban Economics, Urban Economics Association (2021); Young Economist Symposium (2021); 9th Warwick Economics PhD Conference (2021)
  • Accepted at the 50th American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association (AREUEA) National Conference (2022), the 17th CIREQ PhD Students’ Conference (2022) and the AREUEA International Conference in Dublin (2022)
Urban transit infrastructure and inequality: The role of access to non-tradable goods and services
  • Joint work with Brandon Joel Tan.

Since low-income workers are overwhelmingly employed in non-tradable sectors, in response to transit expansion, changes in consumption travel patterns induce a spatial re-organization of low-income jobs in the city, with important implications for inequality. We develop an urban spatial model with heterogeneous worker groups, incorporating travel to consume non-tradable goods and services. The model is estimated using detailed farecard and administrative data from Singapore. After the Downtown Line was built, we find large welfare gains for high-income workers, but near zero for low-income workers. All workers benefit from improved access to consumption opportunities, but jobs in the low-income non-tradable sector move to less attractive workplaces. If we abstract away from consumption travel, we underestimate the line’s effect on inequality by a factor of five. Furthermore, the resulting model fails to capture the spatial re-organization of low-income jobs in the city.

Principal responsiveness in centralized mechanisms: Build to order

How should the supply of public housing be optimally curated? Queuing mechanisms in the literature treat the supply of goods as exogenous. However, in practice, designers can often control the inflow of goods as well. We study a dynamic matching model based on the Singaporean housing allocation process. We show that endogenous supply radically changes the nature of the optimal mechanism. In this mechanism, a key feature is that under-demanded housing is overproduced relative to the static benchmark. Though competition leads to a decrease in efficiency when supply is exogenous, competition instead improves matching when supply is endogenous. Competition can be artificially generated through increasing the thickness of the market by batching applications. We show that doing so is a key feature of the optimal mechanism when the planner places a high weight on match quality.

Economics of Digitization


Entry into two-sided markets shaped by platform-guided search
  • Joint work with Leon Musolff.
  • Awarded the Rising Star Paper Prize at the 20th International Industrial Organization Conference (2022)

We evaluate the problem of firms that operate platforms matching buyers and sellers, while also selling goods on these same platforms. By being able to guide consumer search through algorithmic recommendations, these firms can influence market outcomes, a finding that has worried regulators. To analyze this phenomenon, we combine rich novel data about sales and recommendations on Amazon Marketplace with a structural model of intermediation power. In contrast to prior literature, we explicitly model seller entry. This feature enables us to assess the most plausible theory of harm from self-preferencing, i.e. that it is a barrier to entry. We find that recommendations are highly price elastic but favor Amazon. A substantial fraction of customers only consider recommended offers, and recommendations hence noticeably raise the price elasticity of demand. By preferring Amazon’s offer, the recommendation algorithm raises consumer welfare by approximately US$4.5 billion (since consumers also prefer these offers). However, consumers are made worse off if self-preferencing makes the company raise prices by more than 7.8%. Furthermore, we find no evidence of consumer harm from self-preferencing through the entry channel. Nevertheless, entry matters. The algorithm raises consumer welfare in the short and medium run by increasing the purchase rate and intensifying price competition. However, these gains are mostly offset by reduced entry in the long run.

Work in Progress

Urban Economics


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