

BUILD TO ORDER: ENDOGENOUS SUPPLY IN CENTRALIZED MECHANISMS*

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Abstract

How should the supply of public housing be optimally designed? Commonly used queuing mechanisms treat the supply of goods as exogenous. However, in practice, designers can often control the inflow of goods as well. We study a dynamic matching model where the designer minimizes a convex combination of mismatch count and vacancies. Our framework is directly based on the Singaporean housing allocation process, Build To Order. We show that endogenous supply radically changes the nature of the optimal mechanism. A key feature of the optimal mechanism is that under-demanded housing is overproduced relative to the proportional benchmark. Though competition over housing leads to a decrease in efficiency when supply is exogenous, competition instead improves matching quality when supply is endogenous. Batching applications artificially generates competition and is optimal when the planner places a high weight on match quality.

Keywords: Dynamic Matching, Market Design, Queueing, Allocative efficiency, Waiting Lists.

JEL: C72, C73, D47, D61, D82.

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1 Introduction

Because land and funding are limited, public housing is rationed. Much attention has been placed on how to best allocate public housing, but an equally important question is *what type* of housing to build.¹ These decisions are not made arbitrarily: Governments can infer which developments are more desirable using past realizations of demand. When deciding what apartments to build and how to allocate them, a public housing authority must contend with two objectives: minimizing vacancies and matching households to the apartments they desire. In this setting, how can a government better build and allocate public housing? To answer this question, we form a dynamic queueing model specialized to the Singaporean public housing system, which houses 80% of the resident population.² We characterize the government’s strategy when supply is endogenous and evaluate the welfare loss when supply is exogenous. We show that building underdemanded apartments is crucial to ensure incoming households report their types truthfully. Furthermore, higher demand can improve allocative efficiency when supply is endogenous. In contrast, when supply is exogenous, allocative efficiency is reduced when demand increases.

A large literature, focusing on the optimal allocation of scarce resources, has improved the design of markets ranging from kidney exchange to school choice. Standard models in this literature have centered primarily on markets where the supply of the scarce resource is exogenous. For instance, a designer of a kidney allocation scheme cannot choose the blood types of the organs entering the system. Importantly, under traditional allocation mechanisms, the supply remains fixed and independent of agent preferences. However, in many markets, a centralized agency may control both the incoming supply of goods and the allocation of goods to agents. For instance, in public housing, the government can control the type of apartments built and the allocation of apartments.

We focus our attention on the Singaporean mechanism, dubbed the Build-To-Order scheme (BTO), which we describe in Section 2. Under BTO, households are matched to government apartments to be built in different Singaporean neighborhoods. Every quarter, eligible households arrive and are offered a choice of different apartment sizes in different developments across the city. Each household then submits an application for an apartment size and development. All applicants are assigned a queue number by lottery.³ When a household’s queue number is called, it can choose among the remaining apartments of its queue, or wait and apply next cycle.

Using data on Singaporean housing applications, we undertake descriptive analysis in Section 6 to show that our focus on strategic behavior is empirically justified. We have suggestive evidence

¹See e.g., Waldinger (2018), Van Dijk (2019) for empirical work pertaining to Cambridge, MA and Amsterdam; and Arnosti and Shi (2020) for a theoretical treatment.

²Singapore is an important case study because of the size of its public housing market. Over 80% of Singaporeans live in government-built housing. In 2019, there were over 15,000 apartments transacted; each with a sticker price of at least US\$200,000. This implies that at least US\$3 billion were transacted in apartment value of government-built housing, suggesting large potential gains to improvements in efficiency.

³In practice, a household can be given priority in a few specific instances. For example, if a household has previously been rejected twice, then applies for a flat in a non-mature neighborhood, they are more likely to receive an early queue number. Since non-mature queues are likely to be undersubscribed in the first place, we abstract from non-constant priorities in our model.

that households strategically apply to queues, and the government takes past demand into account when determining where to build new developments. Our descriptive findings take us part of the way to characterizing the government’s optimal strategy in this mechanism, but leave us short. Deepening our understanding of the contrast between allocation settings with exogenous and endogenous supply requires an equilibrium model. In such a model, governments respond optimally to applicant behavior, and vice versa.

To move past the limitations of descriptive analysis, in Section 3, we propose a dynamic model of public housing allocation in which supply can be adjusted over time. At the beginning of each period, the government observes previous household applications, then decides how to allocate new housing across apartment types, where types reflect both apartment size and location. Simultaneously, a household arrives with a private type, corresponding to the apartment type that the household prefers. Newly arrived households select one type of apartment to apply for.⁴ When an apartment type has more applicants than available apartments, the available apartments of that type are randomly allocated. If a household is allocated an apartment, both exit the market. Otherwise, the household pays a waiting cost and applies again in the next period. The government aims to minimize a convex combination of two types of inefficiency: allocation and unassignment. “Allocation” inefficiency captures the government’s desire to assign households to apartments of their type. “Unassignment” inefficiency reflects the government’s aim to minimize the number of households that remain unmatched in a given period.⁵

Our model differs from standard mechanism design in two ways. Our model is carefully tailored to fit the Singaporean setting, which is of interest to policymakers and academics alike because the market for public housing is large. Moreover, we show in Section 3.1 that the optimal unconstrained mechanism is a first-in-first-out mechanism, and detail why the government stopped using a first-in-first-out mechanism because of historical and other policy concerns.

The key contribution of this paper is to develop a model that explores the link between revealed demand and hidden preferences. Due to the wait times inherent to the housing process, households may choose to take a less desirable apartment today in lieu of their preferred option in the future. We examine the circumstances under which *insincere* applications are prevalent—applications where households apply to a queue that does not match their type. We show that under exogenous supply, insincere applications occur when one queue “overflows” and households of that type apply for the under-demanded apartment. In our solution to the government’s dynamic problem under endogenous supply, the optimal mechanism is limited by the reverse issue; the designer’s binding constraint comes from households who desire under-demanded apartments. The government would prefer to only build apartments in high demand; but if the government does so, it cannot motivate households to apply sincerely. In effect, the government trades off exploiting its knowledge about the current stock of households versus learning about the preferences of incoming households.

⁴Unlike the standard literature on mechanism design where the designer observes types within a truthful mechanism, here, in line with the real-world BTO mechanism, the government can only observe applications to queues.

⁵Allocation inefficiency is standard in the literature, and unassignment generates vacancies which are expensive to maintain. We elaborate on the government’s historical incentive to minimize unassignment in Section 2.

To provide further intuition for why the optimal mechanism prescribes supplying less-demanded apartments, consider an environment where households care both about match quality and about match timing. If a household knows only apartments in high demand will be built, it will be tempted to misreport if it prefers an apartment type that is rarely demanded and so built infrequently. Were that household to enter the queue for its desired apartment, it would need to wait for at least one allocation period before having the chance to receive an apartment. Then, unless the cost of waiting is small, the household instead prefers to enter the queue for apartments that are more likely to be built. As alluded to beforehand, in order to assess the importance of endogenous supply, we also analyze an analogous setting in which supply is exogenous. With exogenous supply, vacancies and inefficient allocation occur even under arbitrarily high levels of patience. We analyze this setting and show that there is strictly higher allocative inefficiency in all parameter regions when compared to the setting with endogenous supply.

Our second contribution is to add to a growing literature on thickness in dynamic markets through characterizing when batching multiple application cycles is optimal. We examine the effect of various forms of competition, both when supply is endogenous or when it is exogenous.⁶ We show that when the government can control the supply of housing, oversubscription improves the ability of the government to generate responsive mechanisms. While oversubscription increases both market thickness and competition, the increase in thickness enables the government to manipulate the expected wait times between different queues. This policy lever increases the willingness of households to apply sincerely, improving allocative efficiency. In contrast, when the apartment supply is exogenous, the overwhelming impact of competition is to increase expected wait times. Thus, competition exacerbates the inefficiencies of the exogenous setting, increasing the wedge between the exogenous setting and the endogenous setting. We utilize this insight to show that, in the optimal mechanism, thickness is artificially generated in the market by batching applications.

For our final contribution, we utilize novel data on historical BTO applications to develop a lower bound for the proportion of insincere applications. To do so, we compare fluctuations in applications to apartment types to the outflow of successful applicants. We find consistent evidence of households switching their applications between quarters. Such rapid application shifts are difficult to explain through preference changes, supporting our claim that they are the result of strategic applications. Notably, these switches are associated with the relative oversubscription of apartments. This provides evidence for our focus on the household trade-off between quality of match and wait times.

While we focus our attention on the BTO mechanism in this paper, we note there exist several other instances wherein a centralized planner must choose supply of a good with incomplete information regarding preferences. For instance, consider class schedules. Electives are often substitutable for students, and faculty may be reallocated to address demand spikes. Thus, schools face a year-over-year decision regarding which electives to offer and the number of students to cap each

⁶We refer to environments where households anticipate low odds of success in the queuing lottery as competitive. Oversubscription refers to environments where the average ratio of households to available apartments is high.

course at. The trade-offs in class scheduling are similar to those considered in the BTO mechanism. Similarly, [Budish and Cantillon \(2012\)](#) explore class selection at the Harvard Business School. They show that students strategically report in response to the course allocation mechanism.

Another surprising example can be found in the area of food donations. [Prendergast \(2016\)](#) examines an innovation in the allocation of food donations by Feeding America, the second-largest American charity by revenue. In 2005, a market was established with “Monopoly money” to improve the distribution of food among food banks across the US. Prior to the introduction of the market, food banks had a fixed food need by weight, and received “take it or leave it” offers commensurate with their need levels. These offers made no allowance for the type of food, whether it be produce or pasta. However, these food types featured real differences in storage needs and often individual food banks received food donations outside the Feeding America system. One primary goal of the new market was to ensure that food banks could bid on the types of food they actually wanted when they wanted. Equally important, upon observing the relative pricing of foods, Feeding America was able to then structure its fundraising requests to increase the quantity of highly demanded food types.

One key difference between the Singaporean public housing system and Feeding America is that the Singaporean government does not allocate apartments by an applicant’s willingness to pay, because they believe that housing assistance should not be disbursed to the highest bidder. In this paper, we will take it for granted that a market equilibrium will not achieve the government objective. Instead, we focus on finding the mechanism that minimizes inefficiency subject to the government’s outside constraints.

Related Literature

This paper is closely related to the theoretical literature in matching, much of which stems from studying the problem of optimal student assignment to schools ([Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 2003](#)).⁷ Within this literature, our paper is most closely related to papers on optimal dynamic matching. In this context, agents are “born” in sequence and face a trade-off between taking their best option at birth and waiting for a better match ([Baccara, Lee, and Yariv 2020](#)). [Akbarpour, Li, and Gharan \(2020\)](#) shows that a mechanism designer may wish to focus on increasing market thickness, over matching agents myopically. We show that this insight carries over to our setting, even when the good is produced endogenously.

In particular, we offer a new take on the queuing literature. The vast majority of this literature focuses on the allocation of a fixed supply of goods, such as organ. Recent work in this literature include [Shi \(2019\)](#), which examines the optimal priority system to allocate agents to objects; and [Agarwal et al. \(2019\)](#), which develops a new organ allocation mechanism. In both papers, the supply remains exogenous; the mechanism designer cannot control or alter in the inflow of goods. In this paper, we consider the impact of relaxing this assumption and allow the designer to freely control the types of goods that arrive.

⁷See [Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez \(2013\)](#) for a survey.

Leshno (2019) is closely related to our work, his paper characterizes the optimal mechanism when goods arrive according to an exogenous process. We study a different class of markets in which the designer can not only control the allocation procedure, but also the arrival rate of each good. We show that several of the insights in Leshno (ibid.) are due to this exogenous process, giving rise to different policy prescriptions for social planners with endogenous supply. For instance, while increased household demand decreases allocative efficiency in the exogenous supply setting, it actually improves the government’s ability to manipulate wait times in the endogenous setting. We explore this effect in Section 5.

Several other recent papers consider dynamic allocation problems with private information when monetary transfers are not permissible. Verdier and Reeling (2021) examine the allocation of bear hunting licenses and show that a dynamic mechanism which repeatedly allocates licenses to the same individuals can improve matching over a static mechanism. In our context, individuals only require one apartment, making this approach impractical. In a similar vein, Guo and Hörner (2020) consider repeated good allocation to a single agent whose valuation fluctuates over time. Galichon and Hsieh (2018) shows that as long as money burning is permissible, stability can be achieved in many settings with private information.

2 Policy Background

2.1 The Build To Order Scheme

Over 80% of resident households in Singapore live in government housing, which makes up 80% of the housing stock in Singapore. These apartments, numbering over 1 million, are administered and maintained by the Housing and Development Board (HDB). In Singapore, many government apartments are first introduced into the housing stock via the BTO scheme.

The BTO scheme superseded the previous Registration for Flats System (RFS). Under RFS, homebuyers first chose the broad geographical area in which they wanted to live, then were informed of the cost and exact location of the apartment when their queue number was called. Not only did buyers not know when they could move in to their apartment, but they only had to pay the down payment for any home loan when their apartment was completed; if their apartment was finished early, some of these buyers could not raise enough funds for their down payment. This issue peaked during the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. The government suddenly found itself with a surplus of vacant housing, and incurred heavy maintenance fees. Soon after the crisis, the government switched from RFS to BTO. The key difference between the two mechanisms is that under RFS a first-in-first-out queue is used where households need only apply once, while under BTO households must reapply every quarter. BTO ensured that current applications were an accurate representation of current demand. This motivates our modelling restriction that precludes the government from using allocation mechanisms that reward seniority.⁸

⁸Currently, the HDB allocates its apartments through a complex system of allocation processes with transfers, from which we abstract. This is because we want to keep our model tractable, and moreover, BTO is the scheme

Introduced in April 2001 and taking place each quarter, the BTO exercise allows potential homeowners to ballot for their preferred neighborhood and apartment size.⁹ Each such ballot, termed a “booking”, is secured by a down payment due on application. After the application phase, the HDB assigns each applicant a queue number, indicating the number of other applicants ahead of her in the queue.¹⁰ If, when her turn arrives, she does not like any of her choices (or has no choices), she may withdraw her application. She may then participate in a future cycle. Importantly, upon withdrawing, her position in the queue is lost and not preserved for future applications. Furthermore, households that have withdrawn more than once incur severe penalties to their priority in future applications. Along with the lack of vertical differentiation, this motivates our assumption that households who apply to an apartment size and are successful always accept.

After all applicants have either selected an apartment or withdrawn their application, the HDB begins building the apartments if 70% of all properties in a development have been allocated. In practice, BTO apartments of all sizes are oversubscribed, most by at least 2-3 times. To our knowledge, all BTO exercises have successfully reached the construction stage. These apartments are typically ready for homebuyers to move in within 3 years of the corresponding BTO exercise.¹¹ To prevent immediate arbitrage, apartments may not be sold on the secondary market before 5 years have elapsed after the initial move-in.

These apartments are often oversubscribed because they are sold at highly subsidized prices, with the amount of the subsidy decreasing in apartment size. The modal grant awarded is over \$50,000 of the average cost of \$150,000 for a 2-bedroom apartment in a “non-mature neighborhood.”¹² In a “mature neighborhood” it is over \$40,000 for a similar apartment costing about \$250,000. To improve targeting of needy households, the HDB imposes ceilings on the annual income of BTO applicants. A typical value for such a ceiling would be about \$60,000 for a 2-bedroom apartment and about \$120,000 for a larger apartment. Furthermore, these prices are below the prices for comparable housing available on the private market, generating an implicit subsidy as well.

These subsidies cause purchases on the private market to feature a selection effect. Buyers with greater wealth levels default towards the private market as a result of their inability to receive subsidies, biasing the housing purchases observed in the market. This makes it difficult to utilize

through which most government apartments in Singapore are initially allocated. For instance, in Financial Year 2013/2014, there were 86,298 BTO residential units under construction. Under the next largest comparable scheme “Design, Build and Sell”, a scheme targeting households with higher incomes and with more extensive private developer involvement, only 3,893 units were under construction (Housing and Board 2014). By Financial Year 2018/2019, all residential units under construction were BTO apartments (Housing and Board 2019). See <https://www.hdb.gov.sg/cs/infoweb/residential/buying-a-flat/new/modes-of-sale> for more details.

⁹For more on the historical context for the BTO, see the government archives: <http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/history/events/d33acabb-a341-460c-8fde-99cf0a9270f4>.

¹⁰To enforce social mixing, there are ethnic quotas for each housing development. I.e., there is a cap on the number of Chinese, Malay, and Indian households permitted in each government apartment building. These quotas are enforced at both the BTO stage and on subsequent resale. This aspect of the housing system has been extensively studied in previous work (see Wong 2013 and Wong 2014), so we will abstract from these concerns.

¹¹Wait times recently have lengthened to 5 years because of labor shortages caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

¹²All monetary amounts are in US dollars. A mature neighborhood is one that has been a residential area for over 20 years. Non-mature neighborhoods are typically farther away from the city center and have fewer completed apartments.




Figure 1: *Percentage of apartments per half year by type, built in non-mature neighborhoods.*

private market prices as indicative of actual preferences over housing due to the selection in buyer populations.¹³

2.2 Responsive Apartment Supply

Under BTO, each booking made by a household is a signal of housing demand. This allows the HDB to adjust future housing supply to meet expected demand. In Figures 1 and 2 we compare non-mature and mature neighborhood apartment allocations by type. The larger level of volatility in mature neighborhood apartment supply reflects the government’s willingness to adjust the supply of housing when it has access to demand data.

Figure 1 displays the relative quantities of housing types supplied in non-mature neighborhoods. We observe that while the total quantity supplied fluctuates over time, the relative proportions of each type do not. That is, in neighborhoods where the government has less information, it opts to avoid adjusting the supply of housing.

In contrast, Figure 2 shows that housing in mature neighborhoods changes sharply over time. For instance, while 3- and 5-room apartments initially are built in similar proportions, their relative ratios change dramatically. Comparing Figure 2 and Figure 1, we find a categorical difference between how the government allocates apartments in mature and non-mature neighborhoods. We believe that this allocation difference is due to the government taking in neighborhood level data, and using it to determine future offerings within that neighborhood. In Section 6, we conduct a more detailed analysis using BTO data to show that the government takes household demand into

¹³Despite the hefty subsidies given to successful BTO applicants, a government official we spoke with noted that only about 10% of BTO buyers sell their apartments within 5 to 10 years of purchase. While there is an incentive for arbitrage, this opportunity may only be available to sufficiently wealthy households that are not capital constrained.




Figure 2: *Percentage of apartments per half year by type, built in mature neighborhoods.*

consideration.

3 Model

We model an allocation mechanism with endogenous supply of goods, akin to the Singaporean BTO mechanism. Time is discrete with an infinite horizon, $t \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$. The agents are young households born with preferences over the goods, apartments. Each period, one household arrives. The government has no apartments available at $t = 0$, but builds one apartment in every subsequent period. Apartments and households can be of $|\Theta| = 2$ types, $\Theta = \{A, B\}$.¹⁴ We use θ_t to denote the type of the arriving household in period t , and ϕ_t to denote the period t apartment. Household types are private information, unknown to the government. A household that is matched to an apartment of the same type receives utility h . A household that is matched to an apartment with a different type receives utility $l < h$. A household that is not matched incurs a flow cost of waiting c , and remains in its queue.¹⁵

There is one queue for each type of apartment, the two will be referred to as queue A and queue B . At the beginning of each period, all agents are informed of the number of households and apartments in each queue. An incoming household chooses the queue it wishes to enter. We denote the queue choice of the period- t household by $d_t \in \{A, B\}$. The government chooses Φ_t^A , the probability with which $\phi_t = A$.

¹⁴In the appendix, we consider the model with three types. We show that the optimal mechanism is qualitatively similar to the case with two types.

¹⁵We consider an alternative mechanism in the appendix. Households are able to choose the queue they wish to enter every period. We show that the natural translation of the mechanisms presented in the main body of the paper remain optimal. See Section B of the Appendix for further details.




Figure 3: *Market Timing*

We restrict the government to a form of anonymity: it must treat households within a single queue identically, without regard to their seniority in the queue. If an apartment is available and at least one household is in the corresponding queue, that apartment is randomly allocated through a uniform distribution to one of the households in the corresponding queue. For instance, if k households are in queue ϕ , and there are $m \leq k$ type- ϕ apartments, each household in queue ϕ has the same m/k probability of receiving an apartment.¹⁶

Figure 3 summarizes the timeline of a period.

We use $s^t = (s_A^t, s_B^t) \in \mathbb{Z}^2$ to denote the state of the market in the beginning of period t . If $s_\phi^t > 0$, s_ϕ^t households are in queue ϕ . Otherwise, queue ϕ has no households and $|s_\phi^t|$ type- ϕ apartments are available. The public history at the beginning of time t is $H_t = (x_0, x_1, \phi_1, \dots, x_{t-1}, \phi_{t-1}) \in \{A, B\}^{2t-1}$.

Definition 1. A *mechanism* μ is a sequence $\{\Phi_t^A\}_{t=1}^\infty$, where each Φ_t^A maps public histories to an assignment probability: $\Phi_t^A : H_t \rightarrow [0, 1]$.

We assume the government has commitment power and declares the mechanism μ at the beginning of time. We will focus on Markovian mechanisms that condition only on the payoff relevant variables, summarized by the state. Accordingly, where appropriate, we drop time-scripts. The payoff-relevant information in the public history can be summarized by the state s^t . Then, the government’s strategy is summarized by $\Phi^A : \mathbb{Z}^2 \rightarrow [0, 1]$.

We restrict the government’s mechanism to be Markovian for the following reason. In interviews with Singaporean housing applicants and anonymous officials from HDB, we learned that the BTO mechanism hews closely to being Markovian to disincentivize the non-needies from gambling for an apartment with high resale potential.¹⁷

We denote the expected wait time at the beginning of a period for a household in queue ϕ by $w_\phi(s)$, where s is the current state. Since the expected utility for a household that enters queue d_t

¹⁶We discuss our rationale for modelling the allocation of apartments as a uniform distribution in Section 3.1.

¹⁷The focus on Markovian mechanisms is with loss of generality. In Appendix Section C we show that in competitive settings a non-Markovian mechanism outperforms the optimal Markovian mechanism.

is the match benefit from apartment d_t minus expected waiting costs from queue d_t , their expected utility can be written as:

$$U(d_t, \theta_t, s_t) = \mathbb{E}_\mu \left[l + \mathbb{1}_{\{d_t = \theta_t\}}(h - l) - c \left[d_t \mathbb{1}_{\{s_A \geq 0\}} \frac{s_A}{s_A + 1} (1 + w_A(s_{t+1})) + (1 - d_t) \mathbb{1}_{\{s_B \geq 0\}} \frac{s_B}{s_B + 1} (1 + w_B(s_{t+1})) \right] \right].$$

When a household enters the queue of its type, we will say it has *applied sincerely*. A household only applies sincerely if doing so maximizes its utility:

$$\theta_t \in \arg \max_{d_t} U(d_t, \theta_t, s_t)$$

The government's objective depends on two elements; the quality of matches and the frequency of unassignment.¹⁸ Since there is always one more household than there are apartments available, there will always be a minimum of one unassigned household in every period. To normalize the measure of inefficiency, we only consider unassignment above the baseline of one. In this context, counting the number of vacant apartments is equivalent to counting the number of excess unassigned households. We will use the two measures interchangeably, excepting in Section 5.3 where the difference is relevant.

Because we do not know exactly how the Singaporean government ranks these two sources of inefficiency in practice, we characterize the solution to the government's problem for all possible weightings of allocation and unassignment inefficiency. The government aims to minimize both sources of inefficiency, with weights α and $1 - \alpha$ on allocation and unassignment inefficiency respectively. If the period- t household and the period- τ apartment are matched, the match generates $\mathbb{1}_{\theta_t \neq \phi_\tau}$ allocation inefficiency. Then, m_t , the level of allocation inefficiency in period t , is simply the number of all households that did not apply sincerely and were matched in period t . Similarly, we define the unassignment inefficiency in state $s^t = (s_A, s_B)$ as $v_t = \max\{s_A, s_B\} - 1$, the normalized number of unassigned apartments. A mechanism is evaluated by the *average inefficiency* it creates:

$$U(\mu) = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \sup \frac{1}{T} \mathbb{E}_\mu \left[\sum_{t=1}^T \alpha m_t(\mu) + (1 - \alpha) v_t(\mu) \right]. \quad (1)$$

Definition 2. A mechanism μ^* is **optimal** if it minimizes average inefficiency, $U(\mu^*) = \inf_\mu U(\mu)$.

In Section 4.4, we show that in the limit as $T \rightarrow \infty$, every mechanism generates at least one steady state. Furthermore, even when an optimal mechanism generates multiple steady states, those steady states feature equivalent values of U . This allows us to simplify Equation 1. Let $m(\mu)$ and $v(\mu)$ refer to allocation and unassignment inefficiency in some steady state of μ . Then, the government's problem can be rewritten as:

$$\min_{\mu} \alpha m(\mu) + (1 - \alpha) v(\mu)$$

¹⁸Unmatched households need not be without a home. In Singapore, most of those applying under the BTO mechanism have outside options, such as rentals or living in their parents' homes.

3.1 Model Discussion

Here we detail the rationale behind several important modelling decisions.

Random Uniform Lottery: We restrict the government to mechanisms that cannot offer priority, rather than considering the fully general mechanism design problem. In particular, the government cannot utilize a first-in-first-out mechanism under this assumption. Indeed, in the setting presented in this model, a first-in-first-out mechanism would always achieve the first-best outcome under any parameter region.¹⁹

As previously mentioned, the RFS system previously utilized a first-in-first-out style mechanism and ran a surplus of stock during recessions, costing the HDB millions in maintenance and holding. Additionally, abstracted from our model is an additional government concern: family formation. At 1.14 children per woman in 2018, Singapore has one of the lowest reproductive rates in the world. The Singaporean government has publicly stated that increasing their reproductive rate is one of their major objectives. In order to achieve this objective, the government gives married couples an extra draw from the housing lottery. If a first-in-first-out mechanism were utilized, the benefit to family formation would disappear as soon as a period had passed and the household was placed in the queue. By contrast, through running the weighted lottery every period, the incentive to form a family persists. This motivates our decision to focus on the specific mechanism utilized in Singapore, to show that even when constrained in allocation, welfare is improved substantially under endogenous supply relative to exogenous supply.

Private Information: The model implicitly assumes that the government cannot elicit household preferences through means outside the allocation mechanism. In particular, the government cannot use a Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) style mechanism to encourage households to report truthfully (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak 1964). We draw on recent literature that has shown that BDM may not accurately capture willingness to pay. For instance, Lehmann (2015) and Müller and Voigt (2010) show that the BDM mechanism may produce biased estimates of willingness to pay. Relatedly, Cason and Plott (2014) show that the BDM mechanism confuses subjects due to its complexity, which in turn results in noisy or biased outcomes. A similar line of reasoning motivated the Singaporean government to primarily use household applications to estimate demand (Tan 2010). The following quotation is from the HDB website in response to a question regarding the possible introduction of a registry to track household preferences. “MND and HDB have considered the Member’s suggestion to introduce a register for Build-To-Order (BTO) flat applicants. However, there is no assurance that doing so will improve the planning of BTO launches to meet demand since an indication of interest may not accurately reflect actual demand, as there is no commitment to buy.”

Linear Waiting Costs: We assume waiting costs are linear (as in related work on dynamic matching, e.g., Leshno 2019, Baccara, Lee, and Yariv 2020, Ashlagi et al. 2018). The first reason

¹⁹Consider the following mechanism. Let every incoming household be allocated to a single waiting queue, independent of their type. In every period $t \neq 0$, the government builds an apartment to match the type of the household at the beginning of the queue. Then, every household is incentivized to report truthfully, since their report does not change their expected waiting time.

is normative: exponential waiting costs would imply that a newer household is a higher priority for the mechanism designer than a household that has failed to match multiple times. Linear waiting costs take an agnostic stance on this front. The second reason is practical: if waiting costs were exponential, the state space would grow rapidly. Not only would the number of households of each type need to be tracked, but so would their time of arrival.

4 Results

4.1 Perfect Information Benchmark

We now proceed to the government's design problem. To begin, we analyze the benchmark case where household types are common knowledge. Here, the government can condition queue allocation directly upon household types.

Formally, instead of households choosing d_t , the government learns θ_t and selects $d_t(\theta_t)$. Then, the government can easily ensure that allocative inefficiency is zero. In order to do so, the government must allocate households to queues of their types. That is, to avoid allocating an apartment to a household with a different type, the government sets $d_t(\theta_t) = \theta_t$.

Consider state $(1,0)$. If the incoming household is of type- A , it will be allocated to queue A . Had the government built an apartment of type- B , a vacancy would result. As such, to avoid the possibility of a vacancy, the government must build a type- A apartment to fill the non-empty queue. Therefore $\Phi^A(1,0) = 1$ and $\Phi^A(0,1) = 0$. This mechanism guarantees that the only possible states on the equilibrium path are $(1,0)$ and $(0,1)$. For illustrative purposes, the mechanism can be depicted by the finite state automaton in Figure 4.




Figure 4: *Finite-state automaton depicting the first-best mechanism. Circles indicate states, while arrows depict transitions given an incoming household of type θ .*

Lemma 1. *Suppose household types were public information, and the government could select d_t . Then, the mechanism with $d_t = \theta_t$, $\Phi^A(1,0) = 1$, and $\Phi^A(0,1) = 0$ generates 0 inefficiency.*

It is worth noting that the government perfectly responds to demand when information is public. If the previous household is of type θ , then a type θ apartment is built. Additionally, complete information implies the absence of vacancies in an optimal mechanism. We will later show that vacancies occur with positive probability when the government prioritizes, minimizes allocation inefficiency in an optimal mechanism. Vacancies are present in the real-world setting, implying that

the government lacks the ability to perfectly predict household preferences and that the government prioritizes reducing allocation inefficiency.

4.2 Implementing the First-Best

Given the previous insight, for the remainder of this paper, we assume household types are not public information. To begin, we prove a simple lemma that restricts the state space. A type- A household prefers queue A if and only if the expected wait from entering queue A is no greater than the expected wait of queue B plus $\frac{h-l}{c}$. To see why, suppose the state is $s = (s_A, s_B)$. Then, the type- A household prefers to enter queue A if the following holds:

$$\begin{aligned} u(d_t = A, \theta_t = A) &\geq u(d_t = B, \theta_t = A) \\ \implies \frac{h-l}{c} &\geq \left(\Phi^A(s) \frac{s_A}{s_A+1} + 1 - \Phi^A(s) \right) (1 + w_A(s_{t+1})) - \left((1 - \Phi^A(s)) \frac{s_B}{s_B+1} + \Phi^A(s) \right) (1 + w_B(s_{t+1})) \end{aligned}$$

Observe that the right-hand side is simply the difference in the expected wait times. The algebra is symmetric for a type- B household considering queues B and A respectively.

Definition 3. Let the state be s . $W_\phi(s)$ denotes the expected wait time for an incoming household that enters queue ϕ .

Lemma 2. A type- θ household prefers to apply sincerely if and only if $\frac{h-l}{c} \geq W_\theta(s) - W_{\theta'}(s)$.

The constraint is intuitive. As households care more about matching to an apartment of their type, they are more willing to accept increases in wait times. Similarly, as the cost of waiting increases, their focus shifts, placing less weight on match and more on receiving an apartment immediately.

Definition 4. To simplify notation, we let $\gamma \equiv \frac{h-l}{c}$, represent the ratio of the benefit from sincerely applying to the loss from waiting an additional period.

Now we return to the government problem with private information, and ask if the first-best can be implemented. The first-best mechanism described in Section 4.1 is still necessary to achieve 0 inefficiency. Lemma 2 lets us determine if households are willing to select $d_t = \theta_t$ in any state by computing the difference in expected wait times.

We only need to check the incentives for a type- B household in state $(1, 0)$. The symmetry of the mechanism implies that the incentives are the same for a type- A household in state $(0, 1)$. A simple calculation shows that the wait times from queue A and queue B under the first-best mechanism are $2/3$ and $4/3$ respectively in state $(1, 0)$. Then, households are willing to apply sincerely only if $4/3 - 2/3 \leq \gamma$:

Proposition 1. A mechanism can achieve $m = v = 0$ if and only if $\gamma \geq 2/3$.

For any value of α and $\gamma \geq 2/3$, the optimal mechanism is the same. In state $(1, 0)$, the government always builds an apartment of type A . Similarly, in state $(0, 1)$, the government always

builds an apartment of type B . Incoming households always apply sincerely. An outside observer would see the government responding in a manner commensurate to demand. Notably, a slight lagged affect appears wherein the government’s response occurs a period after a demand shock. Since households are more concerned about correct matching than wait times, the government can maximize efficiency through building apartments that are in high demand.

4.3 Exogenous Supply Benchmark

In this section, we expand on the importance of endogenous supply. To do so, we illustrate what happens when the supply is exogenous. The government is disallowed from choosing the supply of goods. We restrict the government’s choice to $\Phi^A(s) = 1/2$. Note that this setting is equivalent to what [Leshno \(2019\)](#) called a “balanced” setting. The proportion of incoming type- A households and apartments are equal, implying that in the long run, perfect allocation efficiency is still feasible.

The first household will always wish to apply sincerely in equilibrium, since both queues have an equal wait time. The strategy of subsequent households will depend upon the current state. When queue B has no households, i.e., the state is $(k, -(k - 1))$, for $k > 0$, the wait time in queue A is strictly greater than that of queue B . Therefore, incoming type- B households strictly prefer to apply sincerely. The choice of a type- A household will depend upon the difference in expected wait times. Importantly, the wait time for queue A is increasing in the number of households in queue A , due to the exogenous supply. A strategy is a “threshold” strategy, if for some r it dictates a type- A household in state $(k, -(k - 1))$, “enter queue A if $k < r$, otherwise enter queue B .” Threshold strategies are defined similarly for type- B households.

Remark 1. *In any equilibrium, household strategies can be characterized as threshold strategies*

When all households use the same r as their threshold, we denote the expected wait time at the start of the period in state s for a household in queue ϕ by $w_\phi^r(s)$. In equilibrium, the threshold r must be large enough to ensure that incoming households no longer wish to apply sincerely when the state reaches $(r, -(r - 1))$. If a type- A household enters queue A in state $(r, -(r - 1))$, it gives up the chance to immediately receive l but gains h minus the expected wait cost. When $r > 1$, in equilibrium, two constraints must hold. When there are r households in either queue, incoming households must prefer the empty queue. Second, when there are $r - 1$ households in either queue, incoming households must prefer to apply sincerely. Lemma 2 then implies the following constraints:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{IC}_r(r) : \gamma &\leq \frac{r}{2(r+1)} \left[1 + w_A^r(r, -(r-1)) \right] + \frac{1 + w_A^r(r+1, -r)}{2} \\ \text{IC}_r(r-1) : \gamma &\geq \frac{r-1}{2r} \left[1 + w_A^r(r-1, -(r-2)) \right] + \frac{1 + w_A^r(r, -(r-1))}{2} \end{aligned}$$

The wait times $w_A^r(s)$ can be computed as the solution to a linear system of $r+1$ equations.²⁰ We focus on the case $r = 2$ to illustrate a point of comparison with the first-best mechanism. To begin,

²⁰The general system of equations is listed in the appendix.

we compute the solution to the system of equations. This yields wait times of $w_A^2(2, -1) = 5/2$, $w_A^2(1, 0) = 2$, and $w_A^2(3, -2) = 10/3$. Substituting these values into the above equations implies the following:

Lemma 3. *If $\gamma \in [5/2, 10/3]$ and supply is exogenous, the strategy profile where all households use a threshold of 2 is an equilibrium.*

As r , the threshold, increases, the lower bound for γ increases. To see why, observe that as the number of households in a queue increases, each household expects to wait for a longer period of time in that queue. Critically, when the state is $(r - 1, -(r - 2))$, the incentives of an incoming type- A household determine the binding lower bound on γ .

Proposition 2. *As r increases, the lower bound on γ under which the threshold r strategy profile is an equilibrium also increases.*

We focus on $r = 2$, because it is the minimal informative threshold. Suppose $r = 1$ was the threshold in some equilibrium. Then, in state $(1, 0)$, households enter queue B , no matter their type. In effect, households never apply sincerely. Then, the steady state under the $r = 1$ strategy profile would have $1/2$ allocation inefficiency and 0 vacancy inefficiency. Such an equilibrium is not responsive, and is equivalent to allocating apartments independently of type.

For contrast, if the government had controlled the supply of apartments, the first-best could have been implemented when $\gamma > 2/3$. Furthermore, the level of allocation inefficiency is higher for equilibria with $r \geq 2$ relative to the first-best implementation. We compute the level of allocation inefficiency under exogenous supply when $r = 2$. The resulting steady state²¹ has a frequency in states $((1, 0), (2, -1))$ of $(2/3, 1/3)$ generating an inefficiency level of $\alpha/6 + (1 - \alpha)/3$. This inefficiency is directly increasing in the proportion of time spent in state $(2, -1)$. State $(2, -1)$ inherently contains a vacancy and furthermore, households do not apply sincerely. By comparison, when $\gamma > 2/3$, there is 0 inefficiency when supply is endogenous.

This suggests that the ability to manipulate the supply of apartments is incredibly important for the government. Even when only a single household is in a queue, households face temptation to apply insincerely. In the remainder of this paper, we explore the optimal mechanism in various situations with endogenous supply.

4.4 When the First-Best Cannot be Implemented

Returning to the setting with endogenous supply, we proceed by assuming that households are unwilling to apply sincerely under the mechanism that implements the first-best outcome.

Assumption 1. $\gamma < 2/3$.

This parameter range places a higher cost of waiting is relative to the utility gain from matching to the most desirable apartment type. Additionally, Assumption 1 sharply restricts behavior in

²¹We treat symmetric states as one state, i.e., $(1, 0)$ and $(0, 1)$ are reduced to $(1, 0)$.

state $(2, -1)$. In state $(2, -1)$, all households prefer to enter queue B . To see why, consider the expected wait times for each queue under any mechanism. The maximum wait for a household allocated to queue B is 0, because a type- B apartment is available. In contrast, the minimum wait for a household allocated to queue A arises when the government always builds type- A apartments and all incoming households apply to queue B . Then, the minimum wait is $2/3 + 2/3 \cdot 1/2 = 1$. Combined with Lemma 2, a type- A household prefers to apply sincerely only if, $\gamma \geq 1$, which violates Assumption 1. Therefore, in state $(2, -1)$ under Assumption 1 all households will always enter queue B . This statement also holds for any state with more than two households in queue A . The expected wait from queue A in such a state is strictly larger than in state $(2, -1)$, while the expected wait from queue B remains 0.

Lemma 4. *Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Whenever $k > 1$, in state $(k, -(k - 1))$, all households strictly prefer to enter queue B .*

It follows that the state space of any mechanism's steady state is finite. In particular, any optimal mechanism generates a steady state with a finite state space. Furthermore, since it cannot be optimal to remain permanently in state $(2, -1)$ or state $(-1, 2)$ ²², the steady-state must be recurrent unless it never transitions between $(1, 0)$ or $(0, 1)$. Any mechanism that fails to transition between $(1, 0)$ and $(0, 1)$ has inefficiency equal to that of the pooling mechanism (to be defined below). Then, finiteness of the steady-state combined with recurrence implies uniqueness. Before stating the result, we define *queue symmetric*, informally, two steady states are queue symmetric if they are equivalent up to relabelling queue A as queue B , and vice versa.

Definition 5. *A set of steady states \mathcal{SS} is queue symmetric if there exists a permutation $\pi : \Theta \rightarrow \Theta$ such that any two steady states, $ss, ss' \in \mathcal{SS}$, are equivalent up to that permutation $\pi(ss) = \pi(ss')$.*

Lemma 5.

1. *If μ is an optimal mechanism, then there exists at least one steady-state associated with μ .*
2. *If an optimal mechanism μ generates multiple steady states, those steady states are queue symmetric.*

Lemma 5 implies that the average level of inefficiency is well-defined. Either the steady state is unique, or the two possible steady states feature equivalent levels of inefficiency. As such, we will proceed by evaluating mechanisms using the average level of inefficiency in any steady state.

Importantly, when Assumption 1 holds, behavior in state $(1, 0)$ is tightly regulated. Suppose the government attempted to avoid vacancy inefficiency through always building an apartment of type A , i.e., $\Phi^A(1, 0) = 1$. Then, incoming households optimally respond by entering queue A irrespective of their type. Since every period involves one type- A apartment built and one household allocated to queue A , the state remains in $(1, 0)$ indefinitely.²³

²²Such a mechanism would be dominated by the pooling mechanism

²³There are technically several mechanisms that result in similar allocations and equivalent levels of efficiency. For the sake of exposition, we will focus on the pooling mechanism described in the main text.

Definition 6. Under the pooling mechanism, $\Phi^A(s) = 1$ and $d_t = A$.




Figure 5: Finite state automaton depicting the pooling mechanism.

Note that half of the households were of type- A . It then immediately follows that the level of allocation inefficiency is $1/2$ and the level of vacancy inefficiency is 0 .

Remark 2. Under the pooling mechanism, the level of allocation inefficiency is $1/2$ and the level of vacancy inefficiency is 0 .

The above logic implies that under Assumption 1, a mechanism that involves always building an apartment of the type matching the non-empty queue causes all households to prefer allocation to the non-empty queue. Then, the state will never change, because every period a new household enters the queue matching the one that the apartment is built for. To prevent this, the government must build the less desirable apartment with positive probability. This provides a cautionary tale for endogenous supply policy that responds myopically to demand. Doing so provides counterproductive incentives for households, and leads to households opting to not apply sincerely. Furthermore, a naïve estimation of public demand through observing queuing decisions overestimates household satisfaction with current policy.

We proceed by searching for the optimal mechanism with allocation efficiency below $1/2$. In order to improve allocation, we must have $\Phi^A(1,0) \neq 1$. In particular, $\Phi^A(1,0)$ must be low enough to incentivize type- B households to apply sincerely. In state $(2, -1)$, the government always builds type- A apartments to minimize vacancy inefficiency, since it cannot increase the incentive for households to apply sincerely regardless.

Consider the following. In state $(1,0)$, the government builds a type- B apartment with probability q . In state $(2, -1)$, the government always builds a type- A apartment. The state never holds more households in queue A than in $(2, -1)$, since households always enter queue B when $s = (2, -1)$ according to Lemma 4. Similarly, $\Phi^A(0,1) = q$ and $\Phi^A(-1,2) = 0$. We refer to this mechanism as the **two-state mechanism with parameter q** .

Definition 7. The two-state mechanism with parameter q sets $\Phi^A(1,0) = 1 - q$ and $\Phi^A(2, -1) = 1$.

As an aside, we note that such a mechanism could potentially sometimes build a type- B apartment when the state is $(2, -1)$. In the appendix, we formally show that doing so never increases the extent to which households apply sincerely. As such, the optimal mechanism never does so.

Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, if the pooling mechanism is not optimal, there exists q^* such that the two-state mechanism with parameter q^* is optimal.




Figure 6: *Finite state automaton depicting the two-state mechanism. Arrows denote transition probabilities.*

In order to determine the value of q^* , we compute all possible on-path wait times. Let q denote the probability with which the government builds a type- B apartment in state $(1, 0)$. Raising q increases $w_A(1, 0)$, the expected wait time for a household in queue A in state $(1, 0)$. In return, raising q increases the incentive for an incoming type- B household to apply sincerely.

Given q , we can compute the queue specific wait times for incoming households in state $(1, 0)$. Solving yields $w_A(1, 0) = \frac{4q+1}{3-2q}$ and $w_A(2, -1) = \frac{2+q}{3-2q}$. Lemma 2 places a bound on the difference in wait times, if the bound is exceeded, households will not apply sincerely. In order to minimize the probability of entering state $(2, -1)$, $q^*(\gamma)$ is implicitly defined as the solution to:

$$\gamma = \frac{1-q}{2}(1 + w_A(1, 0)) - q(1 + w_A(2, -1)). \quad (2)$$

The right-hand side of Equation 2 is the difference in expected wait times. Inputting the values of $w_A(1, 0)$ and $w_A(2, -1)$ implies:

$$q^*(\gamma) = \frac{3\gamma - 2}{2(\gamma - 3)}$$

In the remainder of this paper, when we refer to the *two-state mechanism* without specifying q , it is understood that $q = q^*(\gamma)$.

When a type- B household is indifferent between entering queue A and queue B , a type- A household in state $(1, 0)$ will strictly prefer to enter queue A . This immediately follows from Lemma 2, since the difference in wait times between queues A and B is simply -1 times the difference in wait times between queues B to A , and therefore is less than 0. By the symmetry of the mechanism, households also apply sincerely in state $(0, 1)$.

Given the symmetry of the optimal mechanism, we refer to states $(k, -(k-1))$ and $(-(k-1), k)$ as $(k, -(k-1))$ when displaying inefficiencies. This can be thought of as identifying two states that have equal numbers of households in the long queue. We proceed by computing the steady state probabilities up to queue symmetric steady states. In the steady state, the transition probabilities at the beginning of a period are given by (where the left column denotes the origin state, and the top row denotes the new state):

	(1, 0)	(2, -1)
(1, 0)	$1 - q^*/2$	$q^*/2$
(2, -1)	1	0

We use P_q to denote the steady state stationary measure for the two-state mechanism with parameter q . That is, $P_q(s)$ denotes the “amount of time” the steady state spends in state s . Let $M(q)$ denote the transition matrix generated by the two-state mechanism with parameter q , then $P_q = P_q M(q)$. Inverting and solving for P_q yields $P_q(1, 0) = \frac{2}{2+q^*}$ and $P_q(2, -1) = \frac{q^*}{2+q^*}$.

The level of inefficiency in the steady state is directly proportional to $P_q(2, -1)$. In state (2, -1) there is a 1/2 probability that the new household is of type A , while all households enter queue B . State (2, -1) is the only source of allocation inefficiency in equilibrium, in state (1, 0) households always apply sincerely. Then, the average level of allocative inefficiency is proportional to the fraction of time that the steady state is in state (2, -1), and equals $\frac{q^*}{2(2+q^*)}$. Similarly, the level of unassignment is equal to the proportion of time that the steady state is in state (2, -1)—in this case $\frac{q^*}{2+q^*}$.

Lemma 6. *Under the two-state mechanism, the level of allocation inefficiency is $\frac{2-3\gamma}{14(2-\gamma)}$ and the level of unassignment inefficiency is $\frac{2-3\gamma}{7(2-\gamma)}$.*

In principle, q does not need to so low as to exactly render type- B households indifferent in state (1, 0), indeed larger values of q can also convince households to apply sincerely. The upper limit for q is the point at which type- A households in state (1, 0) prefer to enter queue B . This constraint is given by:

$$\gamma \geq q(1 + w_A(2, -1)) - \frac{1-q}{2}(1 + w_A(1, 0)). \quad (3)$$

Solving Equation 3 for q implies that $q = \frac{3\gamma+2}{2(\gamma+3)}$. Then, the range of values for q that ensure households apply sincerely in state (1, 0) is $q \in \left[\frac{3\gamma-2}{2(\gamma-3)}, \frac{3\gamma+2}{2(\gamma+3)} \right]$. We utilize the previously calculated values of inefficiency by taking the derivative of inefficiencies with respect to q . Unsurprisingly, both derivatives are positive, that is, increasing q increases inefficiency. Since, inefficiency is increasing in q and therefore minimized by q^* , we continue to focus on the two-state mechanism with parameter q^* .

The above logic implies that there exist two possibly optimal mechanisms, the pooling mechanism and the two-state mechanism. We determine which of the two is optimal, conditional on α , the social planner’s preference parameter over allocation inefficiency versus unassignment inefficiency.

Theorem 1. *Let Assumption 1 hold.*

For $\alpha < \frac{2-3\gamma}{8-5\gamma}$ the optimal mechanism is the pooling mechanism. Otherwise, the optimal mechanism is the two-state mechanism.

Theorem 1 then allows us to consider the impact of an increase in selectivity of households. Formally, we show that the two-state mechanism improves in efficiency in response to a decrease in the ratio of wait cost to relative gain from applying sincerely.

As expected, the threshold at which the two-state mechanism is optimal decreases when the relative gain from applying sincerely increases. The intuition for this comparative static is simple. As the relative gain from the correct match increases, households become more willing to apply sincerely, improving the ability of the government to match households properly. Since the two-state mechanism takes advantage of sincere applications while the pooling mechanism does not, the inefficiency of the two-state mechanism is decreasing in γ .

Corollary 1. *The optimality threshold in Theorem 1, $\frac{2-3\gamma}{8-5\gamma}$, is decreasing in γ .*

To provide a direct welfare comparison, suppose the government were utilitarian. The government would then place a weight of $h-l$ on allocation inefficiency and a weight of c on unassignment inefficiency. Without loss of generality, and to provide consistency with the previous results, we normalize the government’s objective.

Corollary 2. *Let Assumption 1 hold, and suppose $\alpha = \frac{h-l}{h-l+c}$. That is, the government aims to minimize $\frac{h-l}{h-l+c}m + \frac{c}{h-l+c}v$.*

Then, the pooling mechanism is optimal when $\gamma < \frac{9-\sqrt{65}}{4}$. Otherwise, the two-state mechanism is optimal.

The implications of Corollary 2 are similar to those of Theorem 1. When γ is small and households care more about wait times than applying sincerely, mechanisms that ignore preferences are optimal. When γ is large and households care about allocation, mechanisms involving sincere applications do better.

In the context of public housing, this enables a simple comparison of “take-it-or-leave-it” mechanisms and the BTO mechanism. Referencing [Arnosti and Shi \(2019\)](#), this implies that “take-it-or-leave-it” mechanisms are not always suboptimal. Indeed, more intricate mechanisms feature losses that may not be immediately apparent. Both “take-it-or-leave-it” mechanisms and endogenous supply can be optimal in different parameter regions. Crucially, the social planner’s objective as well as the preferences of the recipients need to be considered before determining the appropriate mechanism. For instance, in the US, public housing is primarily used as an alternative to homelessness. In our model, homelessness corresponds to a large value for c , the cost of being homeless an additional period. For contrast, in Singapore, the alternative to receiving an apartment is generally renting or living with family for an additional period. Then, our model suggests that the differences in housing policy between the US and Singapore could be optimal, in contrast to the findings of previous works. In particular, changing the design of US public housing policy to address true preferences may come with a significant vacancy cost.

5 Competition and Market Thickness

To begin this section and fix ideas, we informally define our notions of competition and thickness. A household considers a queue to be “competitive” if it places a high probability on another household entering the same queue it has entered. Phrased differently, competition implies that a household

expects there are or will be several other households in the same queue it is in. Thickness, while related, is used in a slightly different manner. Thickness refers to the number of households applying for queues simultaneously. Thickness implies competition, but the reverse is false.

We will proceed by showing that competition is undesirable when supply is exogenous. To see why, note that competition has a multiplier effect on expected wait times. Importantly, when supply is exogenous, this inherently increases the expected difference in wait times. Then, high levels of competition and exogenous supply dissuade households from applying sincerely. On the other hand, when supply is endogenous, competition gives the government a greater deal of flexibility and allows the government to equalize expected wait times across queues. This effect of competition dominates its multiplier effect, causing competition to actually improve efficiency in certain parameter regions, though overall welfare still decreases. Thickness in particular is highly desirable for the government. We will then show that the government can artificially generate thickness through batching several applications together. Furthermore, when the government places a high weight on sincere applications, i.e., γ is large, it is optimal for the government to batch.

5.1 Persistence

To begin, we consider the impact of persistent household types. Recall that in the original model, household types were independently distributed with uniform probability. In this section, $\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t$ with probability $p \geq 1/2$. The period-0 household still has its type drawn with probability $1/2$ from $\{A, B\}$.

We then find conditions under which the government can implement the first-best. In order for it to do so, it must utilize a mechanism identical to the mechanism described in Section 4.1. Households must prefer to apply sincerely, and the government must build apartments matching the queue of the old household. Namely, $x(\theta, s) = \theta$ and $\Phi^A(s) = \mathbb{1}_{s=(1,0)}$. We emphasize that the government's hands are equally tied under persistent types and the previous implementation of the first-best in Section 4.2. There is increased competition, but the level of market thickness remains the same. In a given period, the same number of households are present relative to before, but if a household applies sincerely, it expects an increased level of competition in the following period. We will show that this hinders the government's ability to implement the first-best outcome. To be exact, the region where the government can implement the first-best shrinks in p .

We proceed in a manner similar to Section 4.2. Computing the wait times conditional upon entering a queue implies the difference in ex-ante expected wait is $\frac{1+2p}{2(2-p)}$. Lemma 2 then implies that the difference in expected wait times is the lower bound on γ .

Proposition 4. *Under persistence p , optimal inefficiency is 0 when:*

$$\frac{1+2p}{2(2-p)} \leq \gamma. \quad (4)$$

We consider the welfare impact of increasing persistence. To do so, we take the derivative of the difference in wait times with respect to p . The result is positive, as the level of persistence increases,

it becomes more difficult to implement the first-best.

Lemma 7. *When demand is persistent, the threshold under which optimal inefficiency is 0 is increasing in p .*

Lemma 7 follows due to households' increased expectation that future applicants will compete for the same queue. A household's incentive to not apply sincerely increases in p . If a household applies sincerely, and is not matched in the current period, the household expects a longer overall wait time relative to settings with lower values of p . By not applying sincerely, households significantly decrease their expected wait times, due to decreased future competition. Then, γ must be higher to motivate households to apply sincerely under the first-best mechanism.

5.2 Oversubscription

Going forward, we return to the no persistence case, $p = 1/2$. We proceed by considering a natural form of competition, oversubscription. We call a housing market oversubscribed when the number of households balloting is larger than the number of apartments available. For reference, under the BTO scheme, apartments of all sizes are oversubscribed, generally at a minimum of $2 - 3\times$. In Section 4.4, we focused on oversubscription at a rate of $2\times$. Larger rates of oversubscription feature an increase in the market thickness, while also directly increasing wait times. In this section, we will show that the increase in thickness dominates, expanding the region within which the government can implement the first-best.

As a simple method of varying the level of oversubscription, we change the number of households that arrive in period 0, without changing the supply of apartments. In every subsequent period, one household appears as before. Let N denote the number of households that arrive in period 0, i.e., the surplus of households. Households have the same information as in previous sections. Household types are private, but households observe the queues other households have entered. In particular, at $t = 0$, all households make their application simultaneously, and do so without information about the other households that are present.

First, we change the number of households appearing at $t = 0$ from 1 to 2. We then derive the optimal mechanism that implements the first-best. In state $(2, 0)$ the government must build a type- A apartment with probability 1, to avoid vacancies. In state $(1, 1)$ the government builds a type- A apartment with probability $1/2$. Suppose this probability was, without loss of generality, less than $1/2$. Then, in state $(0, 2)$ type- A households wish to apply sincerely only if type- B households wish to apply sincerely in state $(2, 0)$. The probability of building a type- A apartment could be increased, strictly improving type- A household's willingness to apply sincerely.

Since when attempting to achieve the first-best there are no vacancies, there are only three possible resulting states $(2, 0)$, $(1, 1)$, $(0, 2)$. We treat the first and last state symmetrically.

Solving for wait times under this mechanism, we find that $w_A(2, 0) = \frac{25}{17}$, $w_A(1, 1) = \frac{27}{17}$. Using these values, we can then compute the incentive for new arrivals to apply sincerely in all states. First, in state $(1, 1)$, the expected waiting time is independent of the queue entered, and so households

always prefer to apply sincerely. Next, we ensure both types wish to apply sincerely when $s = (2, 0)$, in order to do so, we compute the difference in expected waiting times conditional on entering queue A as opposed to queue B . The expected wait time from entering queue A is $2/3(1 + w_A(2, 0))$, while entering queue B gives a wait time of $1 + w_A(1, 1)$. Taking the difference and simplifying generates a value of $\frac{16}{17}$.

Then, a type- A household never has an incentive to not apply sincerely in state $(2, 0)$ since doing so entails increasing their expected waiting time. By comparison, type- B households have a strong incentive to not apply sincerely. We do not consider the incentive to apply sincerely in state $(1, 1)$, because the mechanism implies waiting times are equal between queues.

Lemma 8. *When $N = 2$, the first-best can be implemented iff $\gamma \geq \frac{16}{17}$.*

In particular, comparing this value to the constraint when $N = 1$ implies that the immediate effect of oversubscription was to decrease the ability of the government to implement the first-best outcome. It is instructive to consider why this occurs. While the level of competition is higher, the government's hands are tied when it comes to designing the mechanism. The allocation of households to queues is fixed to avoid allocation inefficiency. In order to avoid unassignment, it must choose $\Phi^A(2, 0) = 1$ and $\Phi^A(0, 2) = 0$ to avoid unused apartments. Last, in state $(1, 1)$ it must choose $\Phi^A(1, 1) = 1/2$ as any other value either unbalances the wait times from entering queue A or queue B , and thereby fails to optimize. Then, $N = 2$ maintains the pernicious effects of competition that were present in the persistence extension, while not providing new tools to deal with the increase in wait times.

Corollary 3. *If γ is high enough to incentivize households to apply sincerely under the first-best mechanism when $N = 2$, then γ is also high enough to incentivize households to apply sincerely under the first-best mechanism when $N = 1$.*

To some extent, the previous result is due to our restriction to mechanisms that only condition upon the current payoff relevant variables. When the state is $(1, 1)$, both types of households are more than willing to apply sincerely. Then, the apartment construction probabilities can be altered in order to incentivize households to apply sincerely in extreme states. Since the binding constraint comes from a type- B household in state $(2, 0)$, we increase the probability that the government builds a type- B apartment when the current state is $(1, 1)$ and the previous state was $(2, 0)$. There also exists an upper bound, when this is done too often, new type- A households will not apply sincerely. In the appendix, we show that when the Markovian assumption is weakened, this increase in competition is helpful and the first-best can be implemented for $\gamma \geq 0.48$.

Next, we show that the negative impact of oversubscription on efficiency when there are two excess households is an anomaly, as we consider the impact of further increasing N . A mechanism that implements the first-best in this setting cannot allow vacancies, but also must incentivize households to apply sincerely. As such, when the state is $(N, 0)$, the government must build a type- A apartment. However, for any intermediate state $(k, N - k)$, where households of both types are present, the government can freely choose any probability for $\Phi^A(s)$. Of course, as discussed




Figure 7: The probability that a type-A apartment is built under the optimal mechanism with over subscription. The x-axis depicts the number of households in queue A minus the number in queue B. The y-axis is the probability that the government builds a type-A apartment in the corresponding state. States $(0, N)$ and $(N, 0)$ are omitted, the corresponding y-values would be 0 and 1 respectively.

above, when $N = 2$ the government has no additional flexibility in choosing $\Phi^A(s)$. For $N > 2$, increasing the level of oversubscription always improves the ability of the government to implement the first-best. This is a direct result of the government's increased ability to equalize wait times between the two queues.

We proceed by solving for the optimal supply probabilities, as well as the associated restrictions on γ . It is worth focusing on the shape of the optimal mechanism under oversubscription. A naïve solution would be to default to building the apartment type that is in higher demand. However, doing so strongly disincentivizes incoming households of the under demanded type from applying sincerely. Thus, the optimal mechanism randomizes; it sometimes builds an apartment in lower demand. In turn, the state is pushed towards a more extreme level: sometimes the less demanded apartment is built, and the incoming household wants the more demanded apartment. In order to achieve the first best, the mechanism cannot build an apartment of the less-demanded type when there are no households in the corresponding queue. This places a hard constraint on the value γ under which the first-best can be implemented.

It is worth noting, that except in this most extreme state $s = (N, 0)$, both apartment types are always built with positive probability by the government. Figure 7 displays the optimal mechanism for varying numbers of excess households. Note, in general, the probability that a less desired apartment is built is larger than the fraction of households in the corresponding queue.²⁴

Based on our previous analysis, we observe that there are two forces at play here. On one hand, increasing the level of competition exacerbates the loss from missing a match in the current period,

²⁴We solve explicitly for the optimal mechanism when $N < 5$, and numerically estimate it when $N \geq 5$.




Figure 8: Lower bound for γ under endogenous supply and exogenous supply. The x-axis displays the number of excess households (in the original model $x = 1$), while the y-axis displays the lower bound on γ . Endogenous Supply Threshold refers to the lower bound on γ under which the first-best can be implemented. Fixed Supply Threshold refers to the lower bound on γ under which individuals are willing to apply sincerely while no apartments are vacant.

as waiting times increase across the board. On the other hand, increasing oversubscription increases the number of free variables the government has access to in order to normalize wait times between reports. This is related to the thickness of the market, and how it better enables the government to match households correctly.

To better distinguish between these two forces, we return to the previous baseline where the government randomly builds either apartment type with probability $1/2$, $\Phi^A(s) = 1/2$. Households freely choose the queue they wish to enter as before. Such a mechanism can never implement the first-best for any value of γ . There always exists a sufficiently extreme state $(x, N - x)$ such that type-A households prefer to not apply sincerely for x large. Instead, we find a weaker condition under which households apply sincerely until there exists a vacant apartment. That is, households apply sincerely except in state $(N + 1, -1)$, where all households enter the queue for type-B apartments. We then determine conditions on γ under which households are incentivized to follow this strategy profile. Such a measure underestimates the direct effect of competition while supply is exogenous, yet this further serves our point to show that the government’s flexibility in choosing the apartment allocation is crucial.

Figure 8 displays the minimal values of γ as the level of competition increases under this mechanism. Despite the increase in thickness generating an increase in expected wait times, the added government control reduces the difference in wait times. Therefore, while exogenous supply causes drastic increases in necessary values of γ when competition increases, endogenous supply generates the opposite effect.

5.3 Batching

One natural concern, is that by directly increasing oversubscription, all households are made worse off due to increased levels of unassignment. Furthermore, in practice, the government doesn't control household demand. That being said, the timing of apartment applications could instead be manipulated by the government. For instance, the government could opt to have households apply quarterly or annually.²⁵ Through delaying the timing of applications, the government increases the level of unassignment in the short run, as incoming households must wait until the next application cycle to enter the market. However, we show that the corresponding increase in market thickness improves the government's ability to incentivize sincere applications.

We adjust the timing of the model in the following manner. At the beginning of the game, before $t = 0$, the government declares the length of application cycles, T . Households that arrive during periods that are not a multiple of T , must wait for the period to reach a multiple of T before entering a queue. While a household waits, the household's type remains hidden, and the household continually pays the flow cost of waiting each period while it remains unmatched. When the period is a multiple of T , all households not in a queue, simultaneously choose a queue to enter. At the same time, except when $t = 0$, the government chooses the types of T different apartments to be built. In effect, the government stockpiles its supply of apartments, then builds all of them simultaneously when a cycle begins.

The government's capability to build T apartments simultaneously requires us to update our notation slightly. The government must still choose the apartment supply, $\Phi^A(s)$, before observing agent reports. Of course, now the government builds T apartments instead of just one apartment. Formally, $\Phi^A : S \rightarrow \Delta\{A, B\}^T$. That is, the government declares a probability distribution over the types of T apartments. Then, the government's objective can be more generally stated as:

$$U(\mu) = \min_{(\Phi^A(s), T)} \alpha m(\mu) + (1 - \alpha)v(\mu),$$

where m and v are the values of allocation and unassignment inefficiency in any steady state of μ as before. The government faces the same objective as before, to minimize the weighted sum of inefficiencies. In this section, unassignment and vacancies are no longer equivalent. This is due to the fact that new households continue to arrive while the government delays the building of apartments. Here, we focus on the original definition of unassignment. Notably, this penalizes high values of T , as the minimal unassignment inefficiency for a given value of T is $(T - 1)/2$. In a sense, this overly penalizes batching procedures, implying that the government places a greater weight on the welfare of its citizens relative to the cost of vacant apartments.

We proceed by describing a mechanism with $T = 2$ and finding conditions under which it is optimal. In the appendix, we consider the general setting and show formally the following mechanism is optimal under these conditions. We will abuse notation and refer to it as the $T = 2$

²⁵Indeed, the government batches applications on the quarterly level.

mechanism where appropriate.

Suppose the government aimed to ensure all households applied sincerely, $m = 0$. In state $(1, 0)$, in order to properly incentivize households, the government randomizes between building one apartment of each type or building two type- A apartments. Let $\Phi^A(1, 0) = [(q, (1, 1)), (1 - q, (2, 0))]$. In state $(2, -1)$, the government always builds two type- A apartments, $\Phi^A(2, -1) = [(1, (2, 0))]$. We can then compute expected wait times conditional upon the state. These in turn allow the expected wait times conditional on reports to be computed. By Lemma 2 the difference must be bounded by γ in order for households to apply sincerely.

In the appendix, we compute the difference in wait times with respect to q . Then, we can solve for the optimal level of q that minimizes the difference in wait times. We find the minimal difference is given by $\gamma \approx 0.294$. This implies that the batching mechanism with $T = 2$ induces sincere applications for $\gamma \geq 0.294$. Notably, this is a substantive improvement for the γ requirement under $T = 1$, namely $\gamma > 2/3$.

Since the mechanism achieves 0 allocation inefficiency, the only inefficiency is unassignment of which there are two sources. The two sources are the default $1/2$ unassignment inefficiency from batching with $T = 2$ and the unassignment inefficiency in state $(2, -1)$. State $(2, -1)$ is only entered from state $(1, 0)$ when two type- A households arrive and with $1 - q$ probability the government builds two type- A apartments, or when two type- B households arrive and with q probability the government builds one apartment of each type. Notably, since a household has $1/2$ probability of being either type, this implies that in the steady state the probability of state $(2, -1)$ is independent of q . Then, so long as γ is high enough such that households apply sincerely and q is accordingly chosen, the level of unassignment inefficiency is independent of q .

As in the previous welfare analysis, we collapse states that are symmetric in A and B. The transition probabilities are given by,

	$(1, 0)$	$(2, -1)$
$(1, 0)$	$3/4$	$1/4$
$(2, -1)$	$3/4$	$1/4$

It is then immediate to observe that the expected time spent in state $(2, -1)$ is $P(2, -1) = 1/4$. Therefore, the total level of unassignment inefficiency generated by this mechanism is the sum of unassignment from $T = 2$ and state $(2, -1)$ or $1/2 + 1/4 = 3/4$. We observe that any mechanism with $T > 2$ occurs a minimum unassignment inefficiency of 1 and therefore is dominated by the optimal $T = 2$ mechanism when $\gamma > 0.294$. It remains to determine if there exists a superior mechanism for $T = 2$. We note that a superior mechanism also needs to overcome the pooling mechanism, which generates 0 unassignment inefficiency but $1/2$ allocation inefficiency.

A superior mechanism with $T = 2$ must generate a lower level of unassignment inefficiency. At the same time, it must improve upon the allocation inefficiency generated by the pooling mechanism. However, in order to improve upon the inefficiency of the pooling mechanism, households must not be matched uniformly. In the appendix, we show that no mechanism can do both. The key tension

is that mechanisms that improve the level of unassignment inefficiency do so at the cost of increasing allocation inefficiency. However, due to the inherent $1/2$ unassignment inefficiency due to setting $T = 2$, such mechanisms are dominated either by the previously defined $T = 2$ batching mechanism or by the pooling mechanism for all α .

As an aside, we note that for $\gamma \in (0.294, 2/3)$, the optimal mechanism depends on α . When α is small, $\alpha \approx 0.17$ the pooling mechanism is optimal. As α increases, the two-state mechanism becomes optimal. Finally, when α is large ≈ 0.94 , the batching mechanism is optimal.

Theorem 2. *When $\gamma \in (0.294, 2/3)$, the optimal mechanism for $\alpha < \frac{2-3\gamma}{8-5\gamma}$ is the pooling mechanism. For $\alpha \in \left[\frac{2-3\gamma}{8-5\gamma}, \frac{34-9\gamma}{38-15\gamma}\right]$ it is the two-state mechanism. Last, for $\alpha > \frac{34-9\gamma}{38-15\gamma}$ the optimal mechanism is the $T=2$ batching mechanism.*

The key implication of Theorem 2, is that batching is only a useful tool when allocation is a greater concern than unassignment. If this is the case, then through increasing the thickness of the market at the cost of increasing the temporary level of unassignment, batching can drastically improve the quality of matches. Simulations show that this trend continues for higher values of T .

6 Stylized Facts

In this section, we present several stylized facts to show that, 1) the Singaporean government does indeed take household demand into consideration when determining supply and 2) the BTO mechanism matches households to apartments below their top preference a significant fraction of the time.

6.1 Data

Our data are taken from the HDB. The data set comprises applications to all BTO developments between 2012 and 2020. We refer to each period with applications and matching as a “cycle.”²⁶ These data were constructed through liberal use of the Wayback Machine to scrape historical BTO results from the HDB website.²⁷ We split the apartment data into types based on the number of rooms, i.e., 3-, 4-, or 5- room apartments.²⁸ The types of apartments in the previous theoretical sections corresponds to the number of rooms provided. We use “supply” to refer to the number of apartments of a certain type available in a given period. Similarly, “demand” refers to the number of applications in a period for those apartments. We aggregate the data across mature and non-mature neighborhoods.

²⁶The number of cycles per year varies during this period: there are 6 cycles each year in 2012-2014; 3 cycles in 2015 and 2020; and 4 cycles in the remaining 4 years, resulting in a total of 40 cycles.

²⁷<http://www.archive.org/>

²⁸Applicants apply to a (location, size) pair in every cycle. The majority of the population chooses among 3-, 4-, and 5- room apartments. The Singaporean Public Housing Administration chooses the proportion of each type of apartments (characterized by size) in each period, but often does not have a choice of location.

Table 1: *Regression of proportional supply of 4-room apartments ($ss4pr$) in period t on proportional supply of 4-room apartments in period $t-1$ to $t-4$, and proportional demand of 4-room apartments ($dd4pr$) in periods $t-3$ and $t-4$. There are $T = 40$ cycles.*

6.2 Lagged Effects of Supply and Demand

To mimic the model, we use proportional demand and supply. Rather than using the total number of k -room apartments built, we transform the data to calculate the per-period proportion of k -room apartments built.

We regress supply on demand from 3-4 cycles ago and lags of supply from 1-4 cycles ago. This specification is chosen because the Public Housing Administration announces its developments approximately two cycles before the cycle takes place, so it can only condition on the observed demand from 3-4 cycles before. From the regression in Table 1, it is evident that the third lag of demand is significant at the 5% level in predicting supply. The coefficient is also positive, indicating that when there is higher demand for 4-room apartments in previous periods, the corresponding supply increases in subsequent periods. Lags of supply are not significant when regressing demand on lags of demand and supply. This implies demand is not backward looking in the same way supply is. This suggests that the government takes previous household requests into consideration when determining what types of new apartments to build, which justifies our focus on the government’s problem in this paper.

6.3 Estimating the Upper Bound on Sincere Applications

We only observe the total number of applicants in each queue. Hence, we cannot observe true household preferences, or even track households at the individual level to observe if their applications are changing over time. This makes it difficult to measure match inefficiency, as we do not know whether a match corresponds to a household receiving its top choice.

Nonetheless, we can estimate an upper bound on truth-telling with aggregate data. We assume individual-level preferences do not change over time and no exiting. Consider the number of households that apply for an apartment type in a given period minus the number of households that actually receive that apartment. Call this number the *oversubscription* (os) for that apartment type. In the next period, the *number of households applying to that apartment type* (dd) should be at least as high as the current period’s oversubscription. If it is not, this means that households must have applied for different apartment types (i.e., they have switched). Then, in period t , the statistic $os_{t-1} - dd_t$ is a *lower bound on the number of period- t switchers* (lsw_t). If $os_{t-1} < dd_t$, we take the conservative view that there are no switchers. Hence,

$$lsw_t := \max\{0, os_{t-1} - dd_t\}.$$




Figure 9: Blue lines indicate 4-room apartments and red lines indicate 5-room apartments. Solid lines indicate the difference between previous oversubscription and current demand, $dd_t - os_{t-1}$. Dashed lines indicate the supply of apartments.

Switching can occur at the individual level, but be indiscernible in the aggregate. As such, lsw is a lower bound for the number of switchers. For instance, if one household switches its application from 3-room apartments to 4-room apartments and another switches its application from 4-room apartments to 3-room apartments, aggregate applications would look identical for both periods. We would be unable to tell that two switches had occurred. The number of switchers is a lower bound for the extent of misreporting. With persistence in household preferences, switchers must have misreported their type at least once. Further, some households may consistently misreport their type, and would not be captured by the switching statistic. Hence, our lsw statistic is a conservative lower bound for the total extent of misreporting in the system.

Figure 9 shows there are several instances where the demand in a given period is below the oversubscription rate from the previous period, indicating the existence of switchers.

With a lower bound on the extent of misreporting, we can approximate a lower bound for mismatch present in the economy. Due to the uniform allocation lottery, the probability that any household receives an apartment in a given period for a given type is simply $P(match_t) = ss_t/dd_t$, where ss_t is the period t supply. Then, the expected number of switchers that are matched to an apartment in period t is:

$$lmis_t := P(match_t)lsw_t$$

Since lsw_t is a lower bound for the total number of people misreporting in period t , the expected

number of mismatches in period t must be at least as high as $lmis_t$.²⁹ We then normalize $lmis_t$ by dividing by the total supply of apartments of that type, and use $lmis_t/ss_t$ as our measure of mismatch. By taking the mean of $lmis_t$ for 4-room and 5-room developments in our time period, we find that at least 6.4% of 4-room apartments and 10.2% of 5-room apartments are allocated to households that would have preferred a different apartment under this measure. Given that this measure underestimates actual levels of mismatch, the potential to improve allocative efficiency is large.

7 Discussion

Beyond the public-housing setting, our study holds broader implications. In economics, it is generally taken for granted that markets can achieve an “efficient” solution.³⁰ However, this notion of efficiency inherently fails to address certain societal objectives, such as avoiding inequality or racial segregation. That is, an environment where one “dictator” receives everything is considered efficient by this notion. If a government wishes to address those objectives, it runs the risk of distorting the market. This can potentially lead to a worse outcome than if the government had done nothing. In particular, when market forces cannot ensure demand is met by supply, the government struggles to accurately measure household preferences. Indeed, many attempts to create centralized markets in the past have failed.

Through the BTO program, Singapore can tackle concerns regarding racial and socioeconomic inequality, while also incentivizing truthful reporting. These concerns have often failed to be addressed by private markets. For instance, the Singaporean government wishes to ensure that adequate housing is affordable for all families. In a city-state like Singapore, where land is a scarce commodity, leaving housing to market forces would fail to ensure affordability. Indeed, in many large modern cities such as New York City or Hong Kong, housing costs have skyrocketed in recent decades. In practice, this exacerbates the effects of inequality, dividing the rich and the poor. Those who seek jobs or amenities provided by the city are often forced to commute long hours or settle for cramped living quarters. While we will abstract from these concerns in our model, they provide the motivation for centralization of the market.

We have developed a model of good allocation with endogenous supply. The model predicts that extreme shifts in preferences are underestimated by simple counts of applications. For instance, if a given apartment type experiences a commonly known surge in popularity, a portion of households will strategically apply for less desirable housing to avoid extended wait times. The model shows that market thickness improves the government’s ability to match households to apartments correctly. One policy implication is that the government should delay the timing of housing developments to increase market thickness artificially.

²⁹Since people are matched to their reports, the number of people who misreport and are matched is equal to the number of mismatches in a given period.

³⁰For instance, the First Welfare Theorem states that in a competitive market with minor regularity conditions, any equilibrium is Pareto efficient.

We also provide a normative statement regarding the added benefit from endogenous supply. In many situations, the mechanism designer has the ability to change the flow of incoming goods, potentially at cost. This model suggests that the gains from doing so can be quite large. Indeed, the gains are likely bigger than a naïve estimate of household preferences would suggest. This follows from a household incentive to not apply sincerely when supply is exogenous. Current mechanism design setups generally focus on allocating objects that arrive exogenously. We show that lumping allocation design of vital goods such as housing, transportation, and food stuffs with the allocations of fixed goods such as organs or wavelengths misses key pieces of the puzzle.

A Appendix—Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1. The expected wait times for each queue are:

$$\begin{aligned}
 w_B(1, 0) &= \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (1/2 \cdot 1/2)^i \\
 &= \frac{1}{1 - 1/4} \\
 &= 4/3 \\
 w_A(1, 0) &= \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} 1/2(1/4)^i \\
 &= 1/2 [w_b(1, 0)] \\
 &= 2/3
 \end{aligned}$$

Then, Lemma 2 implies that the first best can only be implemented when $\gamma \geq w_B(1, 0) - w_A(1, 0) = 2/3$. \square

Proof of Lemma 3. The wait time in a given state and queue depends on the probability of receiving an apartment immediately, as well as the transition probabilities. As such, we can recursively define the waiting times $w_A^m(k, -(k-1))$, when $0 < k < m$, as the solution to the following system of equations using the transition matrix.

$$\begin{aligned}
 w_A^m(k, -(k-1)) &= 1/2 \left[1/2 \cdot \frac{k}{k+1} (1 + w_A^m(k, -(k-1))) + 1/2 \cdot \frac{k-1}{k} (1 + w_A^m(k, -(k-1))) \right] + \\
 &\quad 1/2 [1/2(1 + w_A^m(k+1, -k)) + 1/2(1 + w_A^m(k, -(k-1)))] \\
 w_A^m(m, -(m-1)) &= 1/2 \frac{m-1}{m} (1 + w_A^m(m-1, -(m-2))) + 1/2(1 + w_A^m(m, -(m-1))) \\
 &= \frac{2m-1}{m} + \frac{m-1}{m} w_A^m(m-1, -(m-2))
 \end{aligned}$$

Next, note $w_A^m(m+1, -m)$ only occurs when a household has deviated and entered a queue that is already at capacity while the government simultaneously fails to build a type-*A* apartment. Its value comes directly from the previous equations.

$$\begin{aligned}
 w_A^m(m+1, -m) &= 1/2 \frac{m}{m+1} (1 + w_A^m(m, -(m-1))) + 1/2(1 + w_A^m(m+1, -m)) \\
 &= \frac{m}{m+1} (1 + w_A^m(m, -(m-1))) + 1
 \end{aligned}$$

When $m = 2$ this process generates the following system of equations:

$$\begin{aligned}
w_A^2(2, -1) &= 1/2 \cdot 1/2(1 + w_A^2(1, 0)) + 1/2(1 + w_A^2(2, -1)) \\
w_A^2(1, 0) &= 1/2[1/2 \cdot 1/2(1 + w_A^2(1, 0))] + 1/2[1/2(1 + w_A^2(2, -1)) + 1/2(1 + w_A^2(1, 0))]
\end{aligned}$$

The solution to the system of equations is given by $w_A^2(2, -1) = 5/2$ and $w_A^2(1, 0) = 2$. Given the previous two values, $w_A^2(3, -2)$ can be computed and is equal to $10/3$. Since $r = 2$ is an equilibrium only if both $IC_r(r)$ and $IC_r(r-1)$ are satisfied, this implies the threshold equilibrium $r = 2$ requires $\gamma \in [5/2, 10/3]$. \square

Proof of Proposition 2. To begin, note that as the threshold r increases, the average wait time does as well. To see why, consider the exact difference between a threshold r and threshold $r+1$ strategy. In particular, the difference arises when there are $r-1$ households in a given queue and the incoming household is of that type. Under the threshold $r-1$ strategy, the incoming household enters the empty queue and is immediately allotted an apartment. Under the threshold strategy, the incoming household enters the full queue, further increasing all present households wait times. Therefore, the ex-ante expected wait time is greater under a threshold equilibrium in any state.

Then, consider the $IC(r)$ constraint. Since each $w_A^r(s) > w_A^{r-1}(s)$ and $w_A^r(s+1) > w_A^r(s)$, it follows that both $w_A^r(r, -(r-1)) > w_A^{r-1}(r-1, -(r-2))$ and $w_A^r(r+1, -r) > w_A^{r-1}(r, -(r-1))$. Last, a direct comparison of $IC_r(r-1)$ and $IC_{r-1}(r-2)$ then implies that the solution to the first must be larger than the solution to the second. \square

Proof of Lemma 5. 1. Begin by noting that Lemma 4 implies that in state $(2, -1)$ all incoming households strictly prefer to enter queue B . Then, the state space is bounded by $(2, -1)$ and $(-1, 2)$, and a finite number of states are recurrent. Therefore, at least one steady state exists by standard results in dynamics.

2. For the steady state to fail to be unique, there must be an absorbing state separating either $(2, -1)$ from $(1, 0)$ or $(1, 0)$ from $(0, 1)$. A mechanism that remains in $(2, -1)$ indefinitely cannot be optimal, since it implies both allocation and unassignment inefficiency are higher than the pooling mechanism. On the other hand, a mechanism that fails to transition between $(1, 0)$ and $(0, 1)$ implies uniqueness up to queue symmetric steady states unless the mechanism has different steady states when beginning with a type- A household as opposed to a type- B household. However, this cannot be optimal due to the symmetry of the problem. Suppose a mechanism generated two steady states that were not queue symmetric, which yielded different efficiencies. Then, because both must involve equilibrium behavior of the part of the household, the government could simply use a strategy equivalent to that of the steady state with lower inefficiency everywhere. Through doing so, household behavior must still be equilibrium behavior, and inefficiency would have been lowered, proving that the original mechanism was not optimal. \square

Remark 3. *When the government utilizes the two-state mechanism with q^* an incoming type-A household in state $(1, 0)$ does not have incentive to deviate.*

The following simple result will prove useful for the proof of Proposition 3.

Lemma 9. *The maximal equilibrium allocation inefficiency is $1/2$.*

Proof of Lemma 9. Let $W_A(s) - W_B(s) < \gamma$ for some state s , then each type-A household strictly prefers to enter queue A. As such, allocation inefficiency in s is at most $1/2$ since all type-A households apply sincerely. When $W_B(s) - W_A(s) < \gamma$ a similar argument holds for type-B households. Then, in any state, allocation inefficiency is at most $1/2$. Last, since overall allocation inefficiency is a weighted average of the allocation inefficiency in each state, the overall allocation inefficiency must be at most $1/2$. \square

Proof of Proposition 3. Lemma 4 allows us to focus on mechanisms with state spaces restricted to states $(2, -1)$ through $(-1, 2)$. Since incoming households always enter the short queue in $(2, -1)$ and $(-1, 2)$, the state can never exceed $(2, -1)$ or $(-1, 2)$. In state $(2, -1)$, allocation inefficiency is $1/2$ and vacancy inefficiency is 1. Note that both inefficiency values are weakly larger than inefficiency in state $(1, 0)$ by Lemmas 4 and 9. It follows that the government aims to minimize the proportion of time spend in states $(2, -1)$ and $(-1, 2)$.

Importantly, if allocation inefficiency is lower than $1/2$, the difference in expected wait times in states $(1, 0)$ and $(0, 1)$ can be at most γ . That is, $|W_A(1, 0) - W_B(1, 0)| \leq \gamma$, otherwise type-A households or type-B households strictly prefer to not apply sincerely.

We then optimize over all such possible mechanisms, and show that the two-state mechanism with parameter q^* minimizes inefficiency. Firstly, note that if a type-B household in state $(1, 0)$ strictly prefers to apply sincerely, $\Phi^A(1, 0)$ can be increased while ensuring type-B still has incentive to continue applying sincerely. Furthermore, increasing $\Phi^A(1, 0)$ reduces the probability that the mechanism enters state $(2, -1)$. Then, the optimal mechanism must set $\gamma = W_B(1, 0) - W_A(1, 0)$.

We proceed by considering a mechanism more general than the two-state mechanism. There are two primary differences. First, the government sometimes builds the wrong apartment in state $(2, -1)$, that is $\Phi^B(2, -1)$ is not necessarily 0. Second, type-B households are incentivized to apply sincerely with probability below 1 in state $(1, 0)$. Let $x^B(1, 0)$ be the probability with which a type-B household enters queue A in state $(1, 0)$.

The level of inefficiency generated by this mechanism:

$$\frac{2(1 + x^B(1, 0))q - \alpha(q + x^B(1, 0)(-2 + q + 2\Phi^B(2, -1)))}{2(2 + q + x^B(1, 0)q - 2\Phi^B(2, -1))}. \quad (5)$$

Taking the derivative of the above equation with respect to $\Phi^B(2, -1)$ yields the following, where A is a constant:

$$-\frac{4x^B(1,0)(1+x^B(1,0))(-2+\alpha+\alpha x^B(1,0))(-3+x^B(1,0)+\gamma(-1+x^B(1,0))(-1+\Phi^B(2,-1))+2\Phi^B(2,-1))}{A^2}$$

$$+\frac{\sqrt{-4(2+\gamma(-3+x^B(1,0)))x^B(1,0)(-1+\Phi^B(2,-1))+(-3+x^B(1,0)+\gamma(-1+x^B(1,0))(-1+\Phi^B(2,-1))+2\Phi^B(2,-1))^2}}{A^2}$$

where the exact value of A is irrelevant since A^2 must be positive. The numerator is always negative, note that it can be rewritten as $B + \sqrt{4(2 + \gamma(x^B(1,0) - 3))x^B(1,0)(1 - \Phi^B(2, -1)) + B^2}$, where $B = 4x^B(1,0)(1 + x^B(1,0))(-2 + \alpha + \alpha x^B(1,0))(-3 + x^B(1,0) + \gamma(-1 + x^B(1,0))(-1 + \Phi^B(2, -1)) + 2\Phi^B(2, -1))$. However, $\gamma \leq 2/3$ implies that $4(2 + \gamma(x^B(1,0) - 3))x^B(1,0)(1 - \Phi^B(2, -1)) \geq 0$ and therefore $\sqrt{4(2 + \gamma(x^B(1,0) - 3))x^B(1,0)(1 - \Phi^B(2, -1)) + B^2} \geq -|B|$. Then the derivative of inefficiency with respect to $\Phi^B(2, -1)$ is always positive, and it is optimal to minimize $\Phi^B(2, -1)$ by setting it equal to 0.

We then proceed by taking the derivative of inefficiency with respect to $x^B(1,0)$. The derivative is:

$$\frac{8x^B(1,0)(-3 + \gamma + x^B(1,0) + 4\alpha x^B(1,0) - \gamma x^B(1,0))}{A^2}$$

$$+\frac{\sqrt{4(2 + \gamma(-3 + x^B(1,0)))x^B(1,0) + (-3 + \gamma + x^B(1,0) - \gamma x^B(1,0))^2}}{A^2}$$

Where again A is an omitted constant because A^2 must be positive. Furthermore, a similar line of reasoning works here to imply that this derivative is positive and therefore $x^B(1,0)$ should be set to 0 in an optimal mechanism. We summarize these two findings in the following Lemma.

Lemma 10. *Under Assumption 1, if the pooling mechanism is not optimal, then the optimal mechanism sets $x^B(1,0) = 0$ and $\Phi^B(2, -1) = 0$.*

Then, Lemma 10 implies that the last variable to consider is the value of q . As shown above, q should be minimized subject to the constraint that type- B households in state $(1,0)$ apply sincerely. Therefore, the two-state mechanism is optimal anytime type- B households in state $(1,0)$ have incentive to apply sincerely. Then, given the previous computation of q^* , the two-state mechanism is optimal. \square

We proceed by determining the wait times for the two-state mechanism. These will prove useful for determining the region in which the two-state mechanism is optimal.

Wait time computations for two-state mechanism:

$$w_A(1,0) = 1/2 \cdot q[1 + w_A(1,0)] + 1/2 \cdot q[1 + w_A(2,-1)] + (1-q)/4 \cdot [1 + w_A(1,0)]$$

$$w_A(2,-1) = 1/2[1 + w_A(1,0)]$$

$$\text{Solving yields } w_A(1,0) = \frac{4q+1}{3-2q} \text{ and } w_A(2,-1) = \frac{2+q}{3-2q}.$$

Then, in order for households to apply sincerely, Lemma 2 implies the following constraints on γ :

$$\begin{aligned}\gamma &\geq (1-q)[1+w_A(1,0)] - [q(1+w_A(2,-1)) + (1-q)/2(1+w_A(1,0))] \\ \gamma &\geq \frac{1-q}{2}(1+w_A(1,0)) - q(1+w_A(2,-1))\end{aligned}$$

□

Proof of Lemma 6. Since the two-state mechanism only generates inefficiency in states $(2, -1)$ and $(-1, 2)$, the total inefficiency is directly proportional to the proportion of time spent in those two states. Under the optimal mechanism, the proportion of time in states $(2, -1)$ and $(-1, 2)$ is $\frac{2-3\gamma}{7(2-\gamma)}$. With $1/2$ probability, a household fails to apply sincerely, and there is always a vacant apartment in $(2, -1)$ or $(-1, 2)$. Therefore, the inefficiencies are given by $\frac{2-3\gamma}{14(2-\gamma)}$ and $\frac{2-3\gamma}{7(2-\gamma)}$. □

Proof of Theorem 1. Proposition 3 states that either the two-state mechanism or the pooling mechanism is optimal. We proceed by comparing the inefficiencies generated by the two mechanisms. Lemma 6 directly provides the individual inefficiencies. Summing them and incorporating the government's objective implies that the total level of inefficiency is:

$$\frac{\alpha}{2} \frac{2-3\gamma}{7(2-\gamma)} (1-\alpha) \frac{2-3\gamma}{7(2-\gamma)} = (1-\alpha/2) \frac{2-3\gamma}{7(2-\gamma)} \quad (6)$$

The level of inefficiency under the pooling mechanism is $\alpha/2$, there is no vacancy inefficiency and half of the households fail to apply sincerely. Comparing the two and solving for α yields the threshold $\frac{2-3\gamma}{8-5\gamma}$. □

Proof of Corollary 1. We take the derivative of the threshold in Theorem 1 with respect to γ .

$$\frac{\partial \frac{2-3\gamma}{8-5\gamma}}{\partial \gamma} = \frac{-14}{(8-5\gamma)^2} < 0$$

□

Proof of Corollary 2. A computation similar to the above implies that the government prefers the two-state mechanism when $2(\gamma)^2 - 9\gamma + 2 < 0$ or when $\gamma > \frac{9-\sqrt{65}}{4} \approx .234$. □

Proof of Proposition 4. We begin by computing the difference in the expected wait times under the implementation of the first-best mechanism.

$$\begin{aligned}
W_B(1, 0) &= p \cdot 1/2 + (p \cdot 1/2)^2 + \dots \\
&= \frac{1}{1 - p/2} \\
W_A(1, 0) &= 1/2 + 1/2 \frac{1-p}{2} + 1/2 \frac{1-p}{2} \frac{p}{2} + \dots \\
&= 1/2 \frac{3-2p}{2-p} \\
W_B(1, 0) - W_A(1, 0) &= \frac{1+2p}{2(2-p)}
\end{aligned}$$

Lemma 2 then implies that this mechanism is an equilibrium only if γ bounds the differences in expected wait times. \square

Proof of Lemma 7. The derivative of equation 4 with respect to p is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial[w_B(1, 0) - w_A(1, 0)]}{\partial p} &= \frac{2(2(2-p)) - (1+2p)2(-1)}{4(2-p)^2} \\
&= \frac{5}{2(2-p)^2} > 0
\end{aligned}$$

Then, since the derivative is positive, as p increases, so must γ in order to incentivize households to apply sincerely. \square

Proof of Lemma 8. Wait times under the first-best mechanism, when $N = 2$ can be described according to the following system of equations

$$\begin{aligned}
w_A(2, 0) &= 1/2 \cdot 2/3(1 + w_A(2, 0)) + 1/2 \cdot 1/2(1 + w_A(1, 1)) \\
w_A(1, 1) &= 1/2[1/2 \cdot 1/2(1 + w_A(1, 1)) + 1/2(1 + w_A(2, 0))] + 1/2 \cdot 1/2(1 + w_A(1, 1))
\end{aligned}$$

The solution to the above system of equations is $w_A(2, 0) = 25/17, w_A(1, 1) = 27/17$, the remainder of the proof follows directly from surrounding arguments. \square

Proof of Corollary 3. Referring back to Proposition 1, under $N = 1$ the first-best could only be implemented when $\gamma \geq 2/3$. The threshold, $16/17$ from Lemma 8 is higher, and therefore imposes a stricter condition on γ . \square

Proof of Theorem 2. In order to show that the $T = 2$ batching mechanism is optimal, we proceed in a similar manner to the proof of the optimality of the q^* mechanism. As shown in the main body of the paper, whenever the $T = 2$ mechanism encourages households to apply sincerely, the $T = 2$ mechanism dominates any mechanism with $T > 2$. This follows from the fact that if $T > 2$, then unassignment inefficiency is 1 at a minimum.

Since we have already characterized the optimal mechanisms with $T = 1$, we proceed by proving the $T = 2$ mechanism is optimal among all mechanisms with $T = 2$. Note that for reasons similar to that in the q^* mechanism, it is never optimal to build type- B apartments in state $(2, -1)$. Formally, the problem is the following:

$$U(\mu) = \min_{\Phi^A(1,0) \in \Delta\{0,1\}^2} \alpha m + (1 - \alpha)v(\mu) \quad (7)$$

Standard optimization techniques imply that $\Phi^A(1,0)[0,2] = 0$. Last, we determine the optimal value for q under the $T = 2$ mechanism. We can compute expected wait times for a household already in queue A as the solution to the following pair of equations:

$$\begin{aligned} w_A(1,0) &= 1/4[2q/3(2 + w_A(2,-1)) + (1 - q)1/3(2 + w_A(1,0))] + 1/2 \cdot q/2(2 + w_A(1,0)) \\ w_A(2,-1) &= 1/4 \cdot 1/2(2 + w_A(2,-1)) + 1/2 \cdot 1/3(2 + w_A(1,0)) \end{aligned}$$

Algebra yields the following solutions with respect to q

$$\begin{aligned} w_A(1,0) &= \frac{42 + 196q}{231 - 50q} \\ w_A(2,-1) &= \frac{162 + 4q}{231 - 50q} \end{aligned}$$

Conditional on the state, the difference in wait times is:

$$\begin{aligned} w_A(1,0) - w_B(1,0) &= 1/6 \frac{-1725 + 2357q + 62q^2}{-231 + 50q} \\ w_A(2,-1) - w_B(2,-1) &= \frac{453 - 142q}{1386 - 300q} \end{aligned}$$

This batching mechanism minimizes the maximum of the two differences when $q = \frac{3}{124}(-833 + \sqrt{753905})$, implying that households apply sincerely for γ above $\frac{-453+213/62(-833+\sqrt{753905})}{6(-231+75/62(-833+\sqrt{753905}))} \approx 0.294$. \square

B Queue Hopping

Under the real BTO mechanism, households can freely switch queues between application cycles. In this section, we show that the ability to do so does not change the optimality of the mechanisms presented in the main body of the paper. Under the mechanisms presented in the main body of our paper, no household wishes to change its queue at the beginning of a period. We will formally prove this below.

To provide intuition for the results that follow, note that the incoming household in a given period

always has more information than households currently in a queue. In particular, if a household in a given queue is willing to change queues, then all incoming households will strictly prefer to enter the queue that that household swapped to. As a result, correct allocation is impossible when households switch, causing inefficiency in mechanisms that take advantage of swapping to be high. This insight is specific to stationary markets, wherein households continually arrive to be matched. In a static market, where no new households arrive, swapping could very well be part of an optimal mechanism.³¹

The timing is as follows. In every period when the incoming household would enter a queue, all present households simultaneously also choose a queue to enter. That is, households choose the queue they wish to enter without knowledge of the queue other households are about to enter. We denote the period τ choice of the household that arrived in period t by d_t^τ .

In this setting, we need to define the state variables with more care. Previously, once a household had entered a given queue, its actual type became irrelevant for both the household and the government. Since it could not switch, incoming households only cared about its selected queue, and the government could no longer influence that household’s match. However, now household’s can switch queues between periods, implying that tracking their type is important. Furthermore, households can carry beliefs regarding other household’s types. This is important because their type informs their switching probabilities. In practice, this behavior seems unrealistic. While households might observe application rates, they will not track applications on a household level. We then make the following assumption of naïvete, households only observe the length of each queue, they do not observe the types of other households or the history of household level applications.

Assumption 2. *Households are Markovian—their strategies are a function of the state.*

It is trivial to show that whenever the first-best mechanism was implementable in the original model it remains optimal in the new setting, namely when $\gamma \geq 2/3$. To see why, recall that the first-best mechanism instructed households to report truthfully, and always built an apartment matching the type of the household currently present. Then, a household in the queue that matches its type never wishes to change its queue. If it were to do so, that household could not receive an apartment this period, and furthermore ensures the government will build the “wrong” apartment next period. We then focus our attention on the case where the first-best is not implementable, namely when Assumption 1 holds.

The new incentive constraints implied by the ability to switch are never violated by the pooling mechanism. Switching queues merely ensures that the household cannot receive an apartment in the given period, and will not change the types of apartments the government builds in the future.

We will show that the natural translation of Section 4.2’s two-state mechanism continues to be an equilibrium in household strategies. As before, the two-state mechanism is optimal whenever the pooling mechanism or first-best mechanism are not optimal.

³¹Consider a simple static setting with two households and one apartment of each type. If both households initially apply to the same queue, the household that loses the resulting lottery would prefer to switch queues.

Proposition 5. *Households never switch their queues under the two-state mechanism.*

Furthermore, if neither the pooling nor the first-best mechanisms are optimal, then the two-state mechanism is optimal.

Proof. We first show formally that no household wishes to change its queue under the two-state mechanism on the equilibrium path. We translate the two-state mechanism to the current setting by fixing the government's strategy and incoming household's strategies. Old households reenter their queue in every period. Notably, in state $(2, -1)$ incoming households report type B independently of their type. In addition, we require that households do not swap the queue they have entered in later periods. This generates two new constraints, one for each possible state.

In state $(1, 0)$, it is easy to see that the type- A household does not wish to switch queues. q , the probability with which an apartment of type B is built, was selected to render incoming type- B households indifferent between the two queues. Relative to incoming type- B households, current type- A households expect less competition in queue A and prefer to match correctly. Then, if an incoming type- B household is indifferent, current type- A households strictly prefer to remain in queue A .

Similarly, in state $(2, -1)$ current type- A households expect the same wait time independent of the queue they select. All incoming households select queue B and the government always builds a type- A apartment. By remaining in queue A , they compete with one other household for one apartment, the other household from the previous period. By switching to queue B , they compete with one other household for one apartment as well, the incoming household in this case. Furthermore, in the event the household does not receive an apartment in the current period, it prefers state $(1, 0)$ to state $(0, 1)$.

It remains to prove that the two-state mechanism is optimal in the current environment. Proposition 3 implies that the two-state mechanism is optimal among mechanisms that do not utilize swapping on the equilibrium path. Next, suppose a mechanism involved households swapping queues with probability k , in state $(2, -1)$, where $0 < k < 1$. The willingness to randomize would imply that present households are indifferent between the two queues. Such a mechanism must fail to improve upon the two-state mechanism with respect to allocative inefficiency in state $(2, -1)$. To see why, note that under the two state mechanism, households always sincerely apply except when in state $(2, -1)$ in which case they are immediately matched and exit the market. It remains to show that such a mechanism cannot reduce the proportion of time spent in state $(2, -1)$ through swapping in either state.

Suppose a mechanism involved households swapping their queue in state $(1, 0)$ with probability $0 < k < 1/2$, while incoming households sincerely apply. The willingness of the present household to randomize implies they are indifferent between the two queues. This is despite the fact that the present household knows there is a $1/2$ chance that the incoming household is of type- B and enters queue B . However, the incoming household of type A then must strictly prefer to enter queue B . To see why incoming households prefer to enter queue B , note that there is a $k < 1/2$ chance that the present household enters queue B . If the present household was indifferent between the two

queues, then the incoming household must have a strict preference for queue B . Then, allocative inefficiency under such a mechanism is equal to that of the pooling mechanism.

Last, suppose instead that $1/2 \leq k < 1$. For households to be willing to switch queues, either $\Phi^A(1, 0) < \Phi^B(1, 0)$ or incoming households must not be applying sincerely. In both cases, allocative inefficiency is comparable to that of the pooling mechanism, which by assumption is suboptimal. \square

C Suboptimality of Markovian Mechanisms

While throughout this paper we focus on Markovian mechanisms, we note that doing so is with potential loss of generality. To provide intuition for why the optimal mechanism is not necessarily Markovian, we construct a mechanism that improves upon the oversubscription mechanism developed in Section 5.2 when $N = 2$. However, while the optimal probabilities change, the structure of the optimal mechanism is similar to the mechanisms utilized throughout the main body of the paper.

We weaken the Markovian assumption and allow the government to condition X_t^A, C_t not only on s_t, r_t but also on s_{t-1}, r_{t-1} . That is, the government can “reward” households from the previous period that have waited. We focus on allocation in state $(1, 1)$, where incentive constraints are lax for incoming households of either type. The government can then modify the allocation probabilities in order to better incentivize truthful reporting in states $(2, 0)$ and $(0, 2)$. Altering notation slightly, we use $C_\theta^n(s)$ to indicate the probability with which the government builds a type- A apartment in state (s) when the previous state and report were $(n, 2 - n)$ and θ .

Again, previous reasoning implies that in order to implement the first-best, if the state is $(2, 0)$ or $(0, 2)$ the government must always build a type- A or type- B apartment respectively. However, in state $(1, 1)$, the government may build either apartment type freely. We will suppress the state when indicating $C_T^n(1, 1)$, since $C_T^n(2, 0) = 1$ and $C_T^n(0, 2) = 0$. Utilizing our above methodology, we proceed by computing the expected waiting times for a household in each queue. We will slightly alter our notation to accommodate the new conditioning of w . Let $w_{(r,T)}^n(s)$ indicate the expected waiting time for a household in queue T when the previous report and state were r , $(n, 2 - n)$ and the current state is s . Similarly, $W_{(r,T)}^n(s)$ indicates waiting times for the incoming household.

Note that we must have $C_A^2(1, 1) = C_B^2(1, 1)$. In state $(2, -1)$ all incoming households are allocated to queue B . If there are different wait times depending upon their reported type, they are incentivized to misreport their type in state $(2, -1)$. A similar argument implies $C_A^0(1, 1) = C_B^0(1, 1)$. In the following equations, we drop unnecessary notation. Then, the following system of equations defines expected wait time for an individual already in queue A

$$\begin{aligned} w_{(r,A)}^n(2, 0) &= 1/2 \cdot 2/3(1 + w(2, 0)) + 1/2 \cdot 1/2(1 + w^2(1, 1)) \\ w_{(r,A)}^n(1, 1) &= 1/2[C_r^n(1, 1)1/2 \cdot (1 + w_{(a,A)}^1(1, 1)) + (1 - C_r^n)(1 + w(2, 0))] \\ &\quad + 1/2 \cdot (1 - C_r^n)(1 + w_{(b,A)}^1(1, 1)) \end{aligned}$$

We compute the the following expected wait times for each state, and use the symmetry of the problem to deduce that $C_a^1 = 1 - C_b^1$ and $C_b^2 = C_a^0$.

$$\begin{aligned}
w(2,0) &= \frac{76 - 37C_a^1 - 15C_b^2}{44 - 29C_a^1 + 9C_b^2} \\
w^2(1,1) &= \frac{100 - 31C_a^1 - 61C_b^2}{44 - 29C_a^1 + 9C_b^2} \\
w_b^1(1,1) &= \frac{3(12 + 11C_a^1 + C_b^2)}{44 - 29C_a^1 + 9C_b^2} \\
w_a^1(1,1) &= \frac{100 - 95C_a^1 + 3C_b^2}{44 - 29C_a^1 + 9C_b^2} \\
w^0(1,1) &= \frac{36 - 31C_a^1 + 67C_b^2}{44 - 29C_a^1 + 9C_b^2}
\end{aligned}$$

The next step is to then compare expected wait times for individuals in different settings, we begin with a type-*B* household in state (2,0). The household knows that the supplied apartment will always be type-*A*, and must decide if waiting is worthwhile.

$$\begin{aligned}
W_B(2,0) &= 1 + w_b^2(1,1) \\
W_A(2,0) &= 2/3(1 + w(2,0)) \\
W_B(2,0) - W_A(2,0) &= 1/3 + w_b^2(1,1) - w(2,0) \\
&\implies \gamma \geq \frac{16(C_a^1 - 5C_b^2)}{-44 + 29C_a^1 - 9C_b^2}
\end{aligned}$$

An identical restriction can be computed in state (0,2) by the symmetry of the problem.

Last, we compute the differences in wait times in state (1,1) dependent upon the previous period's state and report.

When the previous state and report are s and r

$$\begin{aligned}
W_{(r,B)}^n(1,1) &= C_r^n(1 + w(2,0)) + (1 - C_r^n)1/2(1 + w_A^1(1,1)) \\
W_{(r,A)}^n(1,1) &= C_r^n/2(1 + w_A^1(1,1)) + (1 - C_r^n)(1 + w(2,0))
\end{aligned}$$

In effect, the wait times are the same except C_r^n is replaced with $(1 - C_r^n)$, hence why setting both equal to 1/2 was previously optimal. In this instance, since this constraint in state (1,1) is lax, changing these values may weaken constraints in states (2,0) and (0,2).

This generates the following differences in wait times

$$W_{(r,B)}^2(1,1) - W_{(r,A)}^2(1,1) = \frac{4(C_A^1 + 3(-4 + C_B^2))(-1 + 2C_B^2)}{44 - 29C_A^1 + 9C_B^2}$$

$$W_{(r,B)}^1(1,1) - W_{(r,A)}^1(1,1) = \frac{(4(-1 + 2C_A^1)(C_A^1 + 3(-4 + C_B^2)))}{44 - 29C_A^1 + 9C_B^2}$$

Then, we proceed by minimizing these differences in wait times through selection of C . Rudimentary optimization yields $C_A^1 = 0.28 = C_B^2$ and $\gamma \geq 0.48$. This is a substantial improvement upon the minimal γ for $N = 2$.

D Labelling

In this section, we consider the impact of relabelling one of the apartment types on the set of achievable outcomes. In particular, suppose that apartment type- B was relabelled as two separate types $B1$ and $B2$. All preferences are maintained, that is if a household is of type B , then it gains h in utility from receiving either $B1$ or $B2$. Similarly, a type- A household gain l in utility from receiving either $B1$ or $B2$. The government can choose any of the three housing types when building an apartment.

Consider what happens if the government implements the previous first-best mechanism, replacing any instance of a type- B apartment with apartment type $B1$. Similarly, any household that would have previously applied for a type- B apartment instead applies for apartment type $B1$. Households still always wish to apply sincerely, the existence of an extra housing type that will never be constructed provides no incentive to deviate. Then, the previous strategy profile remains an equilibrium. Furthermore, suppose the mechanism involved some form of randomization between the two different housing types. Then, with positive probability, an apartment will lie vacant, implying that the first-best cannot be achieved.

Lemma 11. *The first-best in the standard two type case can be achieved if and only if it can also be achieved in the relabelling case.*

E M Apartment types

Here we consider the impact of actually increasing the number of apartment types. Suppose there are now $|T| = 3$ different apartment types. Households are still born with a type in T . If they receive an apartment of their type they gain h in utility, if they receive a different apartment type they receive l .

We begin by considering the first-best outcome. Begin with the mechanism that implements the first-best in the $|T| = 2$ case. It is simple to see that households wish to apply sincerely here. A household that did not receive an apartment in the previous period never has incentive to misreport because it knows an apartment of its type will be built in the current period. Incoming households

of a different type face the exact same incentive constraint as in the original model, and so face no incentives to switch. Last, incoming households that match the current type never have incentive to switch under this mechanism, and so it remains an equilibrium.

Furthermore, no other mechanism can achieve the first-best, in doing so they must risk positive probability of vacancies. Last, this argument holds for all $|T| > 2$, the above arguments did not utilize the fact that $|T| = 3$.

Lemma 12. *The first-best in the standard two type case can be implemented if and only if it can also be achieved in the m type case.*

F Full Regression Tables

In this section, we provide the full regression tables for the regressions run in section 6. Let dd_t^k denote the period t proportional demand for k -room apartments and ss_t^k denote the corresponding proportional supply. For instance, if the total demand for k -room apartments was d_t^k , then:

$$dd_t^k = \frac{d_t^k}{d_t^3 + d_t^4 + d_t^5} \quad (8)$$

With L lags, the regression equations are then:

$$dd_t^k = \beta_0 + \sum_{l=1}^L \beta_l dd_{t-l}^k + \sum_{l=1}^L \alpha_l ss_{t-l}^k + u_t \quad (9)$$

$$ss_t^k = \gamma_0 + \sum_{l=1}^L \gamma_l ss_{t-l}^k + \sum_{l=1}^L \eta_l dd_{t-l}^k + v_t \quad (10)$$

A Granger causality test checks for the joint significance of the coefficients that are not the outcome variable's own lags. In particular, in equation 9, we test $H_0 : \alpha_1 = \dots = \alpha_L = 0$ and in equation 10, we test $H_0 : \eta_1 = \dots = \eta_L = 0$. Table 2 reports the 3-room regression output for the two equations, where each row represents the outcome of a different regression in L .

Tables 3 and 4 show the identical regressions for 4 and 5 room apartments respectively.

We also repeat the previous exercise in computing Granger Causality Wald tests with more lags to show that our results aren't specific to the $L = 4$ lag case. In the first test, table 5 we regress supply of k -room apartments on the lags of demand and supply.

In the second test, 6, we regress demand of k -room apartments on the lags of demand and supply.

Table 2: Regressions of the proportional supply of 3-room apartments on the lags of demand and supply of k -room apartments, $L = 4$.

Term	Estimate	Std. Error	Statistic	P-value
dd^3 - (Intercept)	0.1563933	0.0637243	2.4542166	0.0234070**
$dd^3 - dd^3.l1$	0.0194548	0.2584981	0.0752609	0.9407548
$dd^3 - ss^3.l1$	-0.2115403	0.1725415	-1.2260255	0.2344296
$dd^3 - dd^3.l2$	0.3705368	0.2446663	1.5144576	0.1455544
$dd^3 - ss^3.l2$	-0.2108767	0.1733846	-1.2162371	0.2380547
$dd^3 - dd^3.l3$	0.4183532	0.2574752	1.6248294	0.1198546
$dd^3 - ss^3.l3$	-0.2336175	0.1984268	-1.1773485	0.2528778
$dd^3 - dd^3.l4$	-0.0675088	0.2727350	-0.2475251	0.8070252
$dd^3 - ss^3.l4$	0.0994435	0.1797337	0.5532823	0.5862025
ss^3 - (Intercept)	0.1306651	0.0797669	1.6380870	0.1170411
$ss^3 - dd^3.l1$	0.0872171	0.3235747	0.2695425	0.7902736
$ss^3 - ss^3.l1$	-0.3238397	0.2159787	-1.4994055	0.1493888
$ss^3 - dd^3.l2$	0.3476069	0.3062609	1.1350025	0.2697943
$ss^3 - ss^3.l2$	-0.4333749	0.2170340	-1.9968068	0.0596375*
$ss^3 - dd^3.l3$	0.9262034	0.3222944	2.8737808	0.0093870
$ss^3 - ss^3.l3$	-0.4657697	0.2483805	-1.8752263	0.0754391*
$ss^3 - dd^3.l4$	0.6927182	0.3413958	2.0290766	0.0559723*
$ss^3 - ss^3.l4$	-0.0806761	0.2249815	-0.3585901	0.7236592

Table 3: Regressions of the proportional supply of 4-room apartments on the lags of demand and supply of k -room apartments.

Term	Estimate	Std. Error	Statistic	P-value
dd^4 - (Intercept)	0.8267937	0.2556983	3.2334734	0.0041652***
$dd^4 - dd^4.l1$	-0.1836685	0.3006963	-0.6108107	0.5482044
$dd^4 - ss^4.l1$	0.2611010	0.4469282	0.5842125	0.5656095
$dd^4 - dd^4.l2$	0.2858422	0.2819151	1.0139300	0.3227261
$dd^4 - ss^4.l2$	-0.1427350	0.3832725	-0.3724113	0.7135037
$dd^4 - dd^4.l3$	0.2051124	0.2923152	0.7016824	0.4909627
$dd^4 - ss^4.l3$	-0.4150331	0.3906158	-1.0625096	0.3006662
$dd^4 - dd^4.l4$	0.0980937	0.3116458	0.3147604	0.7562038
$dd^4 - ss^4.l4$	-0.6027755	0.4197671	-1.4359761	0.1664666
ss^4 - (Intercept)	0.4078655	0.1674841	2.4352495	0.0243669**
$ss^4 - dd^4.l1$	-0.2435083	0.1969581	-1.2363460	0.2306533
$ss^4 - ss^4.l1$	0.5800725	0.2927409	1.9815218	0.0614472*
$ss^4 - dd^4.l2$	0.2847560	0.1846563	1.5420867	0.1387273
$ss^4 - ss^4.l2$	-0.3018831	0.2510460	-1.2025011	0.2432133
$ss^4 - dd^4.l3$	0.0600307	0.1914684	0.3135281	0.7571259
$ss^4 - ss^4.l3$	0.0812275	0.2558559	0.3174735	0.7541749
$ss^4 - dd^4.l4$	0.1048131	0.2041300	0.5134625	0.6132537
$ss^4 - ss^4.l4$	-0.3117888	0.2749502	-1.1339825	0.2702118

Table 4: Regressions of the proportional supply of 5-room apartments on the lags of demand and supply of k-room apartments.

Term	Estimate	Std. Error	Statistic	P-value
dd^5 - (Intercept)	0.5968190	0.1664914	3.5846835	0.0018531***
$dd^5 - dd^5.l1$	0.0565173	0.2136385	0.2645462	0.7940661
$dd^5 - ss^5.l1$	-0.2291108	0.3726579	-0.6148019	0.5456175
$dd^5 - dd^5.l2$	0.1895934	0.2795988	0.6780911	0.5054843
$dd^5 - ss^5.l2$	-0.9547078	0.3187900	-2.9947862	0.0071594***
$dd^5 - dd^5.l3$	0.7191566	0.2867186	2.5082312	0.0208634**
$dd^5 - ss^5.l3$	-0.5003730	0.4186202	-1.1952912	0.2459546
$dd^5 - dd^5.l4$	-0.1708950	0.3622027	-0.4718214	0.6421611
$dd^5 - ss^5.l4$	-0.4547671	0.3380584	-1.3452322	0.1936061
dd^5 - (Intercept)	0.3886837	0.0867088	4.4826324	0.0002278***
$dd^5 - dd^5.l1$	0.3709578	0.1112630	3.3340610	0.0033072***
$dd^5 - ss^5.l1$	-0.2100507	0.1940804	-1.0822867	0.2920021
$dd^5 - dd^5.l2$	0.2444077	0.1456152	1.6784496	0.1088172
$dd^5 - ss^5.l2$	-0.9807262	0.1660260	-5.9070645	0.0000089***
$dd^5 - dd^5.l3$	0.5873737	0.1493232	3.9335727	0.0008217***
$dd^5 - ss^5.l3$	-0.2739480	0.2180176	-1.2565408	0.2233987
$dd^5 - dd^5.l4$	-0.1251650	0.1886354	-0.6635289	0.5145682
$dd^5 - ss^5.l4$	-0.2657049	0.1760610	-1.5091636	0.1468936

Table 5: P-values for regressions of supply on lags of demand and supply. n-Period denotes running the regression with all lags up to n application cycles. Each entry represents the p-value of the corresponding test.

	3-Room	4-Room	5-Room
1-Period	0.4618050	0.0063412***	0.0682473*
2-Period	0.3530309	0.0008671***	0.0832922*
3-Period	0.1367794	0.0035596***	0.0011236***
4-Period	0.0626996*	0.0146571**	0.0035629***
5-Period	0.1404518	0.0186040**	0.0018698***

Table 6: P-values for regressions of demand on lags of demand and supply.

	3-Room	4-Room	5-Room
1-Period	0.2343509	0.5532965	0.2722911
2-Period	0.1730362	0.5476371	0.0538814*
3-Period	0.0441072**	0.1493350	0.0055923***
4-Period	0.2239610	0.3734985	0.0310987**
5-Period	0.1710127	0.2454529	0.0892975**

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